Saturday, November 20, 2021

FYI: Ill App Ct (2nd Dist) Rejects "Dual Tracking", Standing, Notice, Other Challenges to Foreclosure

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, recently affirmed a trial court's ruling denying a borrower's motion to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure against him and confirming the judicial sale of the borrower's property.

 

In so ruling, the Second District rejected the various arguments advanced by the borrower that (1) the trial court should not have confirmed the foreclosure sale because justice was not otherwise done in the matter, (2) the trial court should have vacated the default against the borrower because he did not receive notice of the default motion and his first attorney did not appear on his behalf, (3) the borrower was in the midst of loss mitigation when the complaint was filed, and should have been allowed to complete the process, (4) the borrower did not receive notice "of the trial" in violation of his federal and state constitutional due-process rights, and (5) the mortgagee plaintiff lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

This action arose out of a June 2018 mortgage foreclosure action brought by the mortgagee (Mortgagee) against the borrower (Debtor) and other defendants. Debtor was served with a summons which warned default judgment could be entered against him if he failed to answer. Debtor failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint but appeared at a October 2018 status hearing.

 

In December 2018, Mortgagee moved for a default judgment against Debtor alleging Debtor had not yet responded to the complaint. Notice of the motion was mailed to Debtor which stated the motion would be presented on the same date as the next status hearing that was scheduled at the previous hearing. Debtor did not appear at the motion hearing and the trial court granted Mortgagees motion. Notice of the default judgment was sent to Debtor.

 

In March 2019, Mortgagee served Debtor with a notice of sale which indicated the property would be sold in April 2019. Notice of sale was published in the local newspaper and Mortgagee subsequently purchased the property at auction. Shortly after the sale, Mortgagee moved to confirm the sale. When Mortgagee presented the motion to confirm sale, Debtor appeared and the trial court allowed Debtor time to file a response in opposition to the confirmation of the sale.

 

In the interim, Debtor retained an attorney and moved the trial court to vacate default. Debtor alleged he had hired a different attorney after the October 2018 status hearing. Debtor asserted he did not receive notice of the default motion, which was filed with knowledge that Debtor was out of the country, and was not aware of the default until after the January 2019 status hearing. Debtor supposedly learned the property had been sold in April 2019, at which time he contacted his former attorney and was told the attorney was gravely sick and had not appeared at the January 2019 status hearing. Debtor argued that since the sale had not yet been approved, no final order had been entered and he could seek relief.

 

Debtor also referred to section 15-1508(b)(iv) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, arguing the sale should not be confirmed as "justice was not otherwise done in the matter and substantial justice would be served by vacating the judgment and the sale." Debtor also indicated he intended to raise several defenses to the complaint.

 

The trial court set briefing schedules for both motions and, in the interim, Debtor's attorney asked for leave to withdraw. The motion to withdraw was granted and notice of the motion and a copy of the order granting the motion was served on Debtor. The Debtor's motion and Mortgagee's motion were heard at a September 2019 date, at which Debtor failed to appear. The trial court granted Mortgagee's motion confirming the sale and denied Debtor's motion. Debtor appealed.

 

On appeal, the Second District noted that because Debtor did not provide a report of the proceedings or an acceptable substitute, the appellate court would presume the lower court's order conformed to the law and had sufficient factual basis. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hansen, 2016 IL App. (1st) 143720, ¶ 15 (citing Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)).

 

The Appellate Court reviewed the lower court's orders for abuse of discretion and reiterated that without a report of proceedings or acceptable alternative, the court "must presume that the [trial] court did not act arbitrarily but within the bounds of reason, keeping in mind relevant legal principles." Hansen, 2016 IL App (1st) 143720, ¶ 15. Without a record of proceedings, Debtor could only show the court abused its discretion by demonstrating it erred as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 16.

 

Debtor raised the following arguments on appeal (1) the trial court should not have confirmed the sale because justice was not otherwise done in the matter, (2) the trial court should have vacated the default because Debtor did not receive notice of the default motion and his first attorney did not appear on his behalf, (3) he was in the midst of loss mitigation when the complaint was filed, and should have been allowed to complete the process, (4) he did not receive notice "of the trial" in violation of his federal and state constitutional due-process rights, and (5) Mortgagee lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action.

 

The Second District rejected Debtor's first argument due to the absence of a report of proceedings. The Appellate Court reasoned that because there was no record of proceedings, it was unable to determine whether the lower court balanced the parties' interests or acted arbitrarily or beyond the bounds of reason while ignoring applicable principles of law. Id. at ¶ 14. Thus, the Appellate Court presumed the lower court's order "conformed to the law and had a sufficient factual basis." Id. at ¶ 15.

 

The Second District also found Debtor's motion to vacate and object to Mortgagee's motion to confirm the sale were deficient on their face, as once a motion to confirm sale has been filed, a borrower may no longer seek to vacate default judgment of foreclosure. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 27. Debtor could only do so "by filing objections to the confirmation of the sale under the provisions of section 15-1508(b)" of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law.  Id.

 

Finally, the Appellate Court held that a meritorious defense was not sufficient to vacate the sale under the "justice was not otherwise done" provision but Debtor had also to establish that justice was not done because "either the lender, through fraud or misrepresentation, prevented the borrower from raising his meritorious defenses to the complaint at an earlier time in the proceedings, or the borrower has equitable defenses that reveal he was otherwise prevented from protecting his property interests." Id. at ¶ 26.

 

Debtor's second argument -- that the trial court should have vacated default since Debtor did not receive notice of the default motion and his first attorney did not appear on his behalf -- was forfeited for failure to cite any authority in support.  Doherty v. County Faire Conversion, LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 192385, ¶ 36. The Appellate Court further reasoned there was nothing in the record to indicate Debtor did not receive notice and the motion was presented at a hearing of which Debtor had notice.

 

The Appellate Court also found Debtor had forfeited his third argument -- e was in the midst of loss mitigation when the complaint was filed, and should have been allowed to complete the process, as he failed to raise it in the trial court and did not develop his point beyond a mere contention.

 

The fourth argument -- that Debtor did not receive notice "of the trial" in violation of his federal and state constitutional due-process rights -- was forfeited as there was no trial in the matter and Debtor did not make it clear what his argument actually was. The fifth argument -- Mortgagee lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action -- was also forfeited as Debtor failed to raise the argument of lack of standing until after Debtor was held in default and Mortgagee had moved to confirm the sale.

 

Thus, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court properly confirmed the judicial sale and denied Debtor's motion to vacate the underlying default.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

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Wednesday, November 17, 2021

FYI: 11th Cir "Letter Vendor" FDCPA Ruling Vacated, Court to Rehear Case En Banc

On their own initiative, the active judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have taken a vote and will hear the appeal, en banc, in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc.

 

In addition, the Circuit issued an order vacating the Oct. 28, 2021 substituted opinion in Hunstein.  As an en banc appeal, the matter is now considered by all of the active judges of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

 

The Oct. 28 opinion found that the debt collector's use of a letter vendor to print and send a dunning letter to a consumer sufficiently alleged a violation of section 1692c(b) of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and that the complaint's allegation that the information was disclosed to employees of the letter vendor was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to proceed in federal court. We discuss that opinion in detail here. 

 

The effect of today's order is that the Oct. 28 opinion is no longer "law" and all the active judges of the Eleventh Circuit will consider the appeal anew.

 

We expect Chief Judge William H. Pryor, Jr. will appoint three appeal managers. The appeal managers will decide what issues will be considered on rehearing and then prepare a proposed notice to the parties listing the issues to be briefed. Before the notice is issued, the appeal managers circulate it to the en banc court. Other judges can suggest changes, but the appeal managers have significant influence over the scope of the appeal.

 

We anticipate one appeal manager will be Judge Kevin C. Newsom, the author of the vacated Oct. 28 opinion. Typically, a dissenter would also be appointed as an appeal manager, in this case that would be Judge Gerald Tjoflat. However, Judge Tjoflat is on senior status and is not an "active judge" of the Circuit. Thus, we expect another judge may fill his role. Finally, the judge who requested the poll will probably be the third appeal manager.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Illinois   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Tennessee   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


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Financial Services Law Updates

 

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