FYI: 3rd Cir Holds BK Debtors Had No Homestead Exemption In Connection w/ Defective Mortgage

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that:  (1) the Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors in the case did not have an equity interest to claim as a homestead exemption, where defective first-lien mortgage was void only as to junior lien holders and subsequent purchasers, but not as against the debtors themselves, and the total value of mortgage liens exceeded the value of the claimed homestead exemption; and  (2) the bankruptcy trustee's objection to the debtors' claimed homestead exemption was not subject to the 30-day deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), where the objection was not based on the description of the exempted property, Bankruptcy Code provisions governing the claimed exemption, or the amount listed as the value of the claimed homestead exemption.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/111426p.pdf.

 

Appellants-debtors ("Debtors") obtained a loan ("First Mortgage") from a bank that was secured by a mortgage on their residence and which was not properly executed under New Jersey law.  Debtors also obtained a second mortgage loan on the same property.   Several years later, Debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.  In their filings, Debtors claimed exemptions in Schedule C for the full value of their home under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(d) based on the presumed equity in their property and the allegedly defective First Mortgage, which Debtors argued was not secured by their home.

 

Before the expiration of the 30-day period for filing objections to exemptions, Debtors notified the trustee ("Trustee") that the First Mortgage had not been properly acknowledged when it was executed and was thus defective.  Trustee then moved to avoid the First Mortgage lien and to preserve the value of the avoided mortgage for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. 

 

The Bankruptcy Court allowed Trustee to sell Debtors' residence free and clear of all liens.  The net proceeds from the sale amounted to about $200,000.  After the second mortgage and other fees and expenses had been paid, the Trustee was left with almost $42,000, a substantial part of which Debtors claimed for themselves.

 

Following the sale of the home and after the 30-day deadline for objections, Trustee moved to value the homeowner's exemption at zero.  Trustee objected to Debtors' claimed exemptions, asserting, first, that Debtors had no equity in their home to which their claimed homestead exemption could attach and, second, that Debtors' claim to the homestead exemption was subordinate to the Trustee's rights to the sales proceeds, because the First Mortgage was still valid as to Debtors.

 

Debtors cross-moved for an order requiring the Trustee to pay the claimed homestead exemption from the sale proceeds, contending that Trustee's valuation motion was time barred by both Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) and a decision of the U.S. the Supreme Court.  See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992)(ruling that even if a claimed exemption is without legal justification, it will stand if the trustee fails to object within 30 days).  Debtors further asserted that they were entitled to the homestead exemption because the First Mortgage was void as of the date of their bankruptcy filing, rather than voidable by Trustee later in the bankruptcy.

 

Rejecting Debtors' argument that the First Mortgage was void as against them, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Trustee and valued Debtors' homestead exemption at zero.  The bankruptcy court also denied Debtors' cross-motion to compel payment of their exemptions, ruling that, by claiming the exemption under section 522(d) instead of section 522(g), Debtors had failed to provide sufficient notice of their intent to claim an exemption in the proceeds of the sale of their home.
 
The District Court reversed, ruling that Trustee had adequate notice of the claimed exemption through the schedules taken as a whole and that under Taylor, the Trustee's motion was barred because he failed to object within the 30-day deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 4003. 

 

Trustee appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated the district court's order and remanded in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Schwab v. Reilly, ___  U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).  On remand, the district court affirmed the previous Bankruptcy Court order and ruled that the Trustee had no obligation to object to Debtors' exemption.  Debtors appealed.  The Third Circuit affirmed.

 

As you may recall, Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) provides that "a party in interest may file an objection to the list of property claimed as exempt only within 30 days after . . . any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is filed."  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b).

 

In addition, section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code generally allows debtors to protect certain property from creditors where that property is exempt under federal bankruptcy law or under the laws of the debtor's home state.   See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).  In certain limited circumstances, moreover, Section 522 also specifically permits debtors to claim exemptions in property that the trustee recovers.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(providing authority for debtors to claim exemptions in the proceeds of a sale following trustee's avoidance action).  Finally, Section 522 provides in part "[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt . . . is exempt."  11 U.S.C. § 522(l).
 
Noting that Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), was no longer controlling and, further, that Debtors claimed their exemptions under section 522(d) rather than under section 522(g), the Third Circuit ruled that the Trustee had no duty to object within 30 days under the facts in this case.  In so doing, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower court that the asset Debtors' claimed as exempt under section 522(d) was separate and distinct from the proceeds from the sale of the residence.
 
The Third Circuit further concluded that the defective First Mortgage was still valid as to Debtors, but not as to subsequent bona fide purchasers or junior lienholders.  See, e.g., In re Buchholz, 224 B.R. 13 (Bankr. N.J. 1998)(ruling that an improperly recorded mortgage was unsecured as of the date of bankruptcy filing, but that the debtor was still obligated to pay it under New Jersey law). 

 

Moreover, noting that the value of the first and second mortgages combined exceeded the value of the claimed exemptions, the Third Circuit concluded there was no equity in the property to claim as exempt as of the date of the bankruptcy filing and that Debtors were not entitled to benefit from Trustee's avoidance of the defective First Mortgage.  See, e.g., In re cybergenics Corp., 26 F.3d 237, 244-47 (3d Cir. 2000)(noting that debtors may exercise avoidance powers only where such exercise would benefit creditors, not debtors themselves).

 

Importantly, the court also noted that, under the Supreme Court's opinion in Schwab, Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b)'s 30-day time limit applied only to objections based on three elements of a claimed Schedule C exemption:  (1) the description of the exempted property; (2) the Code provisions governing the claimed exemption; and (3) the amount listed as the value of the claimed exemption.

 

The Third Circuit thus concluded that where, as here, the objection is based on "other elements" not found on the face of Schedule C, such as Debtors' market value estimation or the estate's right to retain any value above a claimed exemption, Trustee was not bound by the 30-day time limit.

 

Accordingly, the court ruled that Trustee's objection was timely and valid, as Debtors failed to provide sufficient notice through their Schedule C disclosure that they intended to exempt the property's full value.
 

Ralph T. Wutscher
McGinnis Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: RWutscher@mtwllp.com
 

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FYI: 10th Cir Rules Ability to Tender in TILA Rescission Case Need Not Be Pled in Complaint, No Private FCRA Claim w/o Pre-Suit Dispute Notice

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that borrowers seeking to rescind a loan under the federal Truth in Lending Act: (1) were not required to plead in their complaint ability to tender the loan proceeds to the lender; and (2) could not simply surrender the property that secured the debt if doing so did not restore the lender to its pre-loan status.
 
The court also ruled in part that borrowers have no private right of action under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act against furnishers for providing allegedly incorrect credit information to credit reporting agencies, if the borrowers do not initiate any dispute with the furnisher regarding the information.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at: 

http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-4008.pdf.

 

Plaintiffs-borrowers ("Borrowers") refinanced their home mortgage loan with a lender ("Lender") that supposedly reported incorrect credit information to credit reporting agencies.  Almost two years later, Borrowers applied via telephone to Lender for a second refinancing loan.  Lender denied their application at the end of the phone call.

 

Borrowers subsequently sent written notification to Lender within the three-year rescission period under the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), rescinding their loan and claiming that Lender provided only one copy of TILA's required disclosures when they were entitled to two. 

 

In the ensuing law suit, Borrowers alleged that Lender: (1) failed to provide the required TILA disclosures, thereby entitling borrowers to rescind the loan;  (2) violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") by failing to provide a notice of adverse action after the denial of Borrowers' application for a second refinancing loan; and  (3) violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by furnishing inaccurate credit information to credit reporting agencies.

 

The district court dismissed Borrowers' claims, ruling in part that Borrowers had failed to plead their ability to tender the loan proceeds to Lender, and that Borrowers could not simply turn over their home to Lender as full satisfaction of their rescission obligations if Lender would not be restored to its pre-loan position.  The district court also held that Borrowers had not submitted a "completed application" under ECOA, and that they had no private right of action against the furnisher under FCRA as they had not initiated any dispute of the information with the furnisher. 

 

Borrowers appealed.  The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part.

 

As you may recall, TILA provides that a consumer may rescind a loan for any reason three business days following the later of the "consummation of the transaction" or the delivery of required TILA disclosures.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1).  After the initial three day period, the consumer's right to rescind for non-delivery of the required disclosures ultimately expires three years later.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  In addition, when a consumer rescinds under TILA, the creditor must release its security interest and return any money collected from the consumer, after which time the consumer must tender to the creditor the loan proceeds or their "reasonable value."  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d).

 

Disagreeing with the district court's ruling that Borrowers' failure to plead their ability to repay the proceeds of the loan was fatal to their TILA rescission claim, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court essentially created a new pleading rule that impermissibly modified TILA's rescission procedures.  In so ruling, the Court observed that, although courts may exercise their equitable powers to ensure that consumers will perform their rescission obligations before requiring creditors to release their security interests, the district court's pleading requirement added a condition to the rescission remedy not found in TILA or its regulations, and would further provide categorical relief to creditors even where such relief may not be warranted. 
 
Accordingly, without reaching the merits of Borrowers' TILA rescission claim, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. 

 

Moreover, rejecting Borrowers' contention that TILA's regulations afforded them the option to tender either the loan proceeds or the property obtained with the proceeds, the Tenth Circuit  ruled that, because TILA requires that the creditor be restored to its pre-loan position, simply surrendering Borrowers' home to Lender may not necessarily satisfy their tender obligations.  The Court concluded that there was a factual question in this case as to whether Borrowers' proposed surrender of their home would restore Lender to its pre-loan position.

 

As to Borrowers' ECOA claim, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Tenth Circuit ruled that there was a factual question as to whether Borrowers had submitted a "completed application" for credit that triggered Lender's obligation to provide Borrowers with a notice of adverse action.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(d)(1), (2).

 

Finally, agreeing with the lower court, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, because the Borrowers never disputed the information furnished by the Lender, they had no private right of action against the Lender for reporting the allegedly inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies.  "While a breach of those [verification and correction] duties might expose the furnisher to liability, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (noting the private action limitation applies only to violations of the duties listed in § 1681s-2(a)), the [Borrowers] do not claim to have initiated this process."

Ralph T. Wutscher
McGinnis Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: RWutscher@mtwllp.com
 

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FYI: Ill App Ct Reverses Contempt Finding Against Cook County Sheriff for Failing to Enforce Eviction Order

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, recently reversed an order finding the Cook County Sheriff in contempt of court, in connection with the sheriff's failure to timely enforce an eviction order. 

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:

http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2012/1stDistrict/1103504.pdf

 

The Plaintiff-Appellee property owner ("plaintiff") filed a forcible entry and detainer action in circuit court, and obtained an order of possession ("order") effective on August 10, 2009.  The plaintiff provided the order to the Contemnor-Appellant Cook County Sheriff ("Sheriff"), on August 26, 2009. 

 

When the Sheriff did not enforce the order, plaintiff filed various motions to refresh and extend the order, as well as to find the Sheriff in contempt of court for his failure to evict.  On November 9, 2009, the circuit court continued the plaintiff's "motion for rule to show cause" and directed the Sheriff to appear before the court to show cause as to why he should not be held in civil contempt. 

 

The parties appeared in court on February 8, 2010.  The Sheriff informed the court that the eviction was scheduled to take place on February 10, 2010.  The lower court ordered the Sheriff to effect the eviction by February 10, and continued the matter to March 15, 2010.  

 

At the March 15 hearing, the Sheriff advised the court that the eviction had taken place on February 16, 2010.  The plaintiff argued that the Sheriff should nevertheless be held in contempt of court for failing to follow the court's orders.  The Sheriff argued that the plaintiff's motion to hold the Sheriff in civil contempt was moot, as the eviction had already taken place. 

 

The circuit court entered an order finding the Sheriff in "civil" contempt, imposed a fine of $1,400, and granted the plaintiff attorney's fees.  The Sheriff appealed. 

 

In Illinois, contempt sanctions that are imposed for a coercive purpose are civil in nature.  If the sanctions are imposed to punish past misconduct, the contempt is criminal in nature.  See In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 43 (1990).  Criminal contempt may be direct (if it occurs in the presence of a judge) or indirect (if it occurs outside the courtroom).  A person charged with indirect civil contempt is entitled to all of the constitutional and procedural rights afforded to criminal defendants.  Id. at 58. 

 

The Court began its analysis by noting that "there was no action that the contempt finding could have coerced the Sheriff to take," because the eviction had already taken place at the time the Sheriff was found in contempt.  Accordingly, it held that "in spite of the language of the circuit court's order, it is clear that the Sheriff was found in criminal contempt." The Court further held that the criminal contempt was indirect, because the alleged misconduct occurred outside of the court's presence. 

 

Having made that determination, the Appellate Court reversed the circuit court's ruling.  It noted that the Sheriff was not provided with "many of the constitutional and procedural rights" to which he was entitled.  Specifically, the Appellate Court emphasized that the Sheriff was not given notice that he could be held in indirect criminal contempt, because the motion filed by the plaintiff specifically referenced civil contempt. 

 

The plaintiff attempted to avoid this result by arguing that the Sheriff could have attempted to assert any of the rights to which he was entitled, but chose not to do so.  The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that "the fact that the Sheriff did not assert his rights is immaterial given that he was never informed he was facing criminal charges."   

 

Thus, the Appellate Court held that, "given the complete lack of procedural and constitutional rights afforded to the sheriff, we conclude that the circuit court's order finding the Sheriff in contempt and imposing a fine must be reversed." 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
McGinnis Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: RWutscher@mtwllp.com
 

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FYI: Illinois Amends Licensing Statute As to Fraud Fines, Liability as to "Predatory Lending Database" Violations, Other Changes

On August 3, 2012, Illinois enacted numerous changes to the Illinois Residential Mortgage License Act, including:  (1) increases in fines for fraud and deceptive conduct;  (2) liability for violations of the "predatory lending database" law;  (3) changes as to license fees, averments and NMLS-related amendments;  (4) limitations on short sale activities "on behalf of a borrower or homeowner;"  and (5) limitations on loan modification activities "on behalf of a borrower or homeowner."

A copy of the complete amendments is available at:  http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/97/PDF/097-0891.pdf

Among other things, the amendments include:

Definitions Changes and Additions:

-  "Servicing" now also "includes management of third-party entities acting on behalf of a residential mortgage licensee for the collection of delinquent payments and the use by such third-party entities of said licensee's servicing records or information, including their use in foreclosure." 

-  "Mortgage loan originator" now also includes "an individual engaged in loan modification activities as defined in subsection (yy) of this Section. A mortgage loan originator engaged in loan modification activities shall report those activities to the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation in the manner provided by the Department; however, the Department shall not impose a fee for reporting, nor require any additional qualifications to engage in those activities beyond those provided pursuant to this Act for mortgage loan originators."

-  "Broker" now includes persons who engage in "loan modification" activities.

-  "Loan Modification" activities means "for compensation or gain, either directly or indirectly offering or negotiating on behalf of a borrower or homeowner to adjust the terms of a residential mortgage loan in a manner not provided for in the original or previously modified mortgage loan" (emphasis added).

-  "Short sale facilitation" means "for compensation or gain, either directly or indirectly offering or negotiating on behalf of a borrower or homeowner to facilitate the sale of residential real estate subject to one or more residential mortgage loans or debts constituting liens on the property in which the proceeds from selling the residential real estate will fall short of the amount owed and the lien holders are contacted to agree to release their lien on the residential real estate and accept less than the  full amount owed on the debt" (emphasis added).

Substantive Changes:

Increases $25k cap for fraud and deception fines to $75,000 for each separate count as to companies, and $3k for specific fraud or deception acts or $6k for pattern-and-practice fraud and deception as to LOs.

Creates liability for "failure to comply with or violation of any provision of Article 3 of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act," which includes the so-called "predatory lending database" provisions.  Parallel provision for title insurers, title agents, and escrow agents.  Violations must now be referred to HUD.  Information entered into the so-called "predatory lending database" now clarified to include "total monthly consumer debt" of the applicant.

Makes it unlawful for "any individual who holds a mortgage loan originator license to provide short sale facilitation services unless he or she holds a license under the Real Estate License Act of 2000."

New license averments:  (1) that the licensee "will not charge or collect advance payments from borrowers or homeowners for engaging in loan modification" activities as defined by the amendments; and  (2) the licensee "will not structure activities or contracts to evade provisions of" the IRMLA.  Parallel provisions also now apply as to LOs.

Eliminates disciplinary action for non-complicit whistle-blowers (i.e., a "licensee who files a report with the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation that another licensee is engaged in one or more violations pursuant to this Act shall not be the subject of disciplinary action by the Department, unless the Department determines, by a preponderance of the evidence available to the Department, that the reporting person knowingly and willingly participated in the violation that was reported").

License application fees increased to $2,700 annually.

Makes various amendments to coordinate with the NMLS system.

Effective Date:  Jan. 1, 2013

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
McGinnis Tessitore Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: RWutscher@mtwllp.com
 

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FYI: MA District Ct Rules Against Servicer On Various Issues in Loan Mod MDL

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently rejected a loan servicer's argument that, under the Financial Institution Supervisory Act, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a consolidated group of lawsuits stemming from allegations regarding supposed errors in the loan modification process.  A copy of the opinion is attached. 

 

Various homeowners initiated lawsuits against their mortgage servicer (the "servicer").  These lawsuits were consolidated, and the plaintiffs divided their claims into four groups:  Group 1 alleged that the servicer "breached obligations set forth in form contracts that it send to its borrowers pursuant to HAMP;" Group 2 alleged violations, among other things, of state consumer protection statutes, on the basis that the servicer "strung along and misled" them; Group 3 claimed that the servicer breached their negotiated "Loan Modification Agreements," and Group 4 asserted allegations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). 

 

The servicer moved to dismiss most of the claims involved in the instant litigation, arguing that the Financial Institution Supervisory Act ("FISA") precludes subject matter jurisdiction.  The servicer also attacked the specific allegations made by Groups 1-4, discussed in greater detail below.  

 

As you may recall, FISA provides the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") with the authority to issue consent orders to address "unsafe or unsound" practices by the financial industry.  12 U.S.C. Sec. 1818(b), 1813(q).  Further, FISA prohibits any action that could affect the enforcement of an OCC consent order.  Id. at Sec. 1818(i)(1). 

 

The servicer entered into a consent order with the OCC requiring it among other things to devote financial and other resources to the loss mitigation process sufficient to "ensure compliance with all applicable federal and state laws..."  The servicer is also required pursuant to the OCC consent order to "remediate all financial injury to borrowers cause by any errors, misrepresentations or other deficiencies..." 

 

In the instant litigation, the servicer argued that it was taking the necessary actions to comply with the consent order, and that the court's review of the plaintiffs' allegations could affect the enforcement and other aspects of the consent order.       

 

The court disagreed.  It noted that FISA's "primary purpose is to prevent federal courts from usurping the OCC's power to enforce its own consent orders against parties to the orders," rather than non-parties who may have separate remedies at law. 

 

The court also scrutinized the text of FISA, as well as related documents, observing that although FISA includes a mechanism by which parties to consent orders may challenge those orders, there is no similar mechanism for non-parties.  Therefore, the court held that "it follows that the jurisdiction bar is not meant to displace a non-party's right to present its claims to a federal court..."  Similarly, the court observed that a publication from the OCC encouraged borrowers to use "every avenue possible" to prevent a foreclosure sale -- which the court stated "would hardly be necessary" if the OCC construed FISA as precluding subject matter jurisdiction from state and federal courts. 

 

Therefore, the court held that the consent order and related documents "do not establish an exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' financial injuries," and accordingly denied the servicer's related motion to dismiss under FISA. 

 

Having determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the court turned to the breach of contract claims of the Group 1 plaintiffs.  The Group 1 plaintiffs alleged that form trial payment plan ("TPP") agreements provided to them by the servicer constituted an offer which they accepted; that the servicer allegedly breached the agreements; and that these breaches allegedly cost the plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue other options to save their homes, and caused the plaintiffs to incur additional fees and costs.  The servicer cited precedent from another jurisdiction providing that TPP plans are not binding contracts.  See Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1499 (Cal Ct. App. 2011) ("Nungaray").  However, the court found that case distinguishable, in that it was undisputed that the Nungaray plaintiffs did not provide documentation required by the TPP agreement at issue in that case, which was alleged to have occurred here.  Therefore, the court denied the servicer's motion to dismiss the claims of the Group 1 plaintiffs. 

 

Next, the court considered the servicer's argument that several of the state UDAP allegations of the Group 2 plaintiffs were preempted by the National Bank Act ("NBA"). The court found that claims based on "fraud or misrepresentation" were not preempted, but that several allegations based on "procedures that [the servicer] devised to service its mortgage loans" were preempted.

 

Next, the court addressed the allegations based on the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "Rosenthal Act"), wherein the plaintiffs argued that the servicer violated the Rosenthal Act by making false and misleading statements in connection with the collection of mortgage debts.  The servicer countered these arguments by pointing out that in each case it was the plaintiff who contacted the servicer.  However, the court again sided with the plaintiffs.  It noted that upon being contacted by a borrower to obtain a loan modification, the servicer typically sent out a forbearance agreement providing that if a signed agreement or payment was not received, foreclosure activities would resume.  The court found that this "could have misled the recipients as to the true range of options available to them," and thus declined to dismiss these claims. 

 

Finally, the court considered the Group 4 FDCPA allegations.  The servicer responded with a similar argument to the one it asserted against the Rosenthal Act allegations.  The court again disagreed.  It relied upon a recent Sixth Circuit decision providing that an entity such as the servicer is either a creditor or a debt collector, and cannot "define itself out of either category" in order to avoid being subject to the FDCPA's prohibitions.  Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F. 3d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
McGinnis Tessitore Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: RWutscher@mtwllp.com
 

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