Friday, August 12, 2016

FYI: FCC Issues TCPA Report and Order on Calls "Made Solely to Collect a Debt Owed to or Guaranteed by the United States"

As noted in our prior update (see prior email below), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding recent amendments to the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) that excepted calls "made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States" from the TCPA's "prior express consent" requirement.

The comment period having expired, the FCC yesterday released its Report and Order (FCC 16-99).

A copy of the complete Report and Order is available at: Link to Report and Order

As one of the dissenting Commissioners points out, the FCC's Report and Order "refuses to address whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans are 'owed to or guaranteed by' the federal government."

The FCC's Report and Order addresses among other things the following:

Number of Calls Limited to 3 per 30 Days

The FCC's Report and Order limits the number of debt collection calls subject to the statutory exception to three in thirty days.

The FCC states that "these limits apply in the aggregate to all calls from a caller to a debtor, regardless of the number of debts of each type the servicer or collector holds for the debtor." In addition, "[t]his cap of three calls per thirty days is cumulative for debt servicing calls and debt collection calls." In other words, "the call limit on federal debt collection calls to wireless numbers applies for each servicer or collector."

Notwithstanding the statutory exception, and in support of its position, the FCC states "callers may make additional autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls if they obtain the prior express consent of the called party, or if they dial manually."

Called Parties May Opt Out At Any Time, For Any Reason

The FCC also states that "consumers have a right to stop the covered autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice servicing and collection calls to wireless numbers at any point the consumer wishes." The request to stop calling may be made "using any reasonable method, including orally or in response to a text message."

The FCC goes on to state that "zero federal debt collection calls are permitted once a debtor asks the owner of the debt or its contractor to cease federal debt collection calls. This requirement that callers immediately honor a request to stop calls applies even where the caller has previously obtained prior express consent to make federal debt collection calls."

In addition, "[t]his stop-calling request is specific to the debt and the consumer, and transfers with the debt; once the consumer has asked that the number of federal debt collection calls be reduced to zero, only the consumer can alter that number restriction. Consequently, a stop-calling request applies to a subsequent collector or servicer of the same debt."

Right to Opt Out Must Be Clearly Disclosed

The FCC's Report and Order requires callers to inform debtors of their right to make such a request. The disclosure must:

- "inform the debtor that he or she has a right to request that no further autodialed, artificial-voice, or prerecorded-voice calls be made to the debtor for the life of the debt"

- a stop-calling request "may be made by any reasonable method"

- "be made in a manner that gives debtors an effective opportunity to stop future calls"

- be made "within every completed autodialed call with a live caller, whether the caller speaks with the debtor or leaves a voicemail message"

- be included in prerecorded or artificial voice messages

- be included in text messages, or sent "in a separate text message that contains only the disclosure and is sent immediately preceding the first covered text message"

"Solely to collect a debt"

The FCC opines that the term "solely to collect a debt," as used in the TCPA amendment, means only "debts that are delinquent at the time the call is made or to debts that are at imminent risk of delinquency as a result of the terms or operation of the loan program itself."

The FCC clarifies that its definition requires that "at the time the call is made, the debt is delinquent or there is an imminent, non-speculative risk of delinquency due to a specific, time-sensitive event that affects the amount or timing of payments due, such as a deadline to recertify eligibility for an alternative repayment plan or the end of a deferment period."

The FCC also clarifies that a caller "need not wait until a debtor is delinquent to begin making certain debt servicing calls. Rather a caller may make debt servicing calls following a specific, time-sensitive event that affects the amount or timing of payments due, such as a recertification deadline or the end of a deferment period, and in the 30 days before such an event."

Stated together, exempt calls must occur: "(1) during the period of delinquency for debt collection calls; and (2) following an enumerated, specific, time-sensitive event and in the 30 days before such an event for debt servicing calls."

A call that includes "marketing, advertising, or selling products or services, and other irrelevant content is not solely for the purpose of collecting a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States."

"Owed to or guaranteed by the United States"

The FCC states that "the debt must be currently owed to or guaranteed by the federal government at the time the call is made. Debts that have been satisfied are not among the covered debts, and debts that have been sold in their entirety by the federal government are, likewise, not covered."

Who may be called?

Because the statutory exception applies to calls made "solely to collect a debt," the FCC determined that "the covered calls may only be made to the debtor or another person or entity legally responsible for paying the debt."

Reassigned Numbers

Calls "to wrong numbers are not covered by the exception," nor are calls "to reassigned wireless numbers." The FCC determined that "the caller risks liability for the call after the first call to the number, if the number has been reassigned from the debtor to a third party."

What constitutes a "call made"?

The FCC states that a "call is any initiated call," and "[t]he call need not be completed, and need not result in a conversation or voicemail."

Duration of Calls, Size of Texts

The Report and Order states that "artificial-voice and prerecorded voice calls may not exceed 60 seconds, exclusive of any required disclosures." In addition, "[t]ext messages are generally limited to 160 characters."

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

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From: Ralph T. Wutscher <rwutscher@mauricewutscher.com>
Date: Thu, May 26, 2016 at 5:12 PM
Subject: FYI: FCC Issues NPRM as to Calls "Made Solely to Collect a Debt Owed to or Guaranteed by the United States"
To: "Ralph T. Wutscher"
Cc: Florida Office, San Francisco Office, San Diego Office, Atlanta Office, Chicago Office, Philadelphia Office, Cleveland Office, Cincinnatti Office, Indiana Office, New Jersey Office, Texas Office, New York Office, Alabama Office, Boston Office, DC Office

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding recent amendments to the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), seeking comment on among other things:

(1) which calls are covered by the phrase "solely to collect" under the amendments;

(2) the meaning of the phrase "a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States" in the amendments;

(3) how the FCC should restrict the number and duration of covered calls;

(4) whether consumers should have a right to stop covered calls at any point the consumer wishes; and

(5) whether callers should be required to inform consumers of such a right.

A copy of FCC's NPRM is available at: Link to NPRM

As you may recall, Congress amended the TCPA in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 to allow autodialed calls "made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States" without the prior express consent of the called party.

The amendments also require the FCC to "prescribe regulations to implement the requirements" within nine months of enactment of the amendments (i.e., by Aug 2, 2016), and to adopt rules to "restrict or limit the number and duration" of these covered calls.

"Solely to collect a debt"

Among other things, the FCC proposes to interpret "solely to collect a debt" to mean "only those calls made to obtain payment after the borrower is delinquent on a payment." The FCC also proposes that "servicing calls" -- i.e., "calls to convey debt servicing information" -- should be included in covered calls.

The FCC seeks comment on how it should interpret the term "delinquent," or whether covered calls may "only be made after the debtor is in default," how it should define "default," and whether a distinction should be made "between default caused by non-payment and a default resulting from a different cause under the terms of the debt instrument."

The FCC also seeks comment on what types of calls should be included in "servicing calls," how to distinguish servicing calls from "marketing calls," whether covered calls should be allowed to start only after a borrower is delinquent on a payment, and whether delinquency should also be a trigger for debt servicing calls.

"Owed to or guaranteed by the United States"

The FCC also seeks comment on the meaning of the phrase "a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States," including "whether there are any circumstances under which a party other than the federal government obtains a pecuniary interest in a debt such that the debt should no longer be considered to be 'owed to . . . the United States.'"

For example, the FCC asks for comment on "[w]hat is a debt 'owed to' the United States and a debt 'guaranteed by' the United States?," and "[d]oes the phrase 'owed to or guaranteed by' include debts insured by the United States?," and "would a debt still be 'owed to . . . the United States' if the right to repayment is transferred in whole or part to anyone other than the United States, or a collection agency collects the funds and then remits to the federal government a percentage of the amount collected?"

Who May Be Called

The FCC seeks comment on whether the phrase "solely to collect a debt" should "include only calls to the person or persons obligated to pay the debt," and whether the FCC should "limit covered calls to the cellular telephone number the debtor provided to the creditor, e.g., on a loan application."

The FCC also seeks comment on "whether calls to persons the caller does not intend to reach, that is persons whom the caller might believe to be the debtor but is not, are covered by the exception," and proposes to exclude such calls from the exception.

In addition, the FCC proposes "that calls to a wireless number a debtor provided to a creditor, but which has been reassigned unbeknownst to the caller, are not covered by the exception, but have the same one-call window the [FCC] has found to constitute a reasonable opportunity to learn of reassignment."

Who May Make Covered Calls

The FCC proposes to allow "calls made by creditors and those calling on their behalf, including their agents," but asks whether "there a limiting principle to determining who should be deemed to be acting on behalf of the creditor."

The also seeks comment on "whether and, if so, how the Supreme Court's recent decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez [regarding unaccepted offers of judgment, and the mootness doctrine] should inform our implementation of the Budget Act amendments to the TCPA."

Limits on Number and Duration of Covered Calls

The FCC proposes to limit the number of covered calls to three per month, per delinquency and only after delinquency. The FCC also proposes "that the limit on the number of calls should be for any initiated calls, even if unanswered by a person."

The FCC also seeks comment on "the maximum duration of a voice call, and whether [it] should adopt different duration limits for prerecorded- or artificial-voice calls than for autodialed calls with a live caller," whether the FCC should limit the length of text messages, and how to count "debt servicing calls" for purposes of the proposed three-call limit per month.

Consumer's Ability to Stop Covered Calls

The FCC proposes "that consumers should have a right to stop [covered] calls at any point the consumer wishes," and that "stop-calling requests should apply to a subsequent collector of the same debt."

The FCC also proposes "to require callers to inform debtors of their right to make such a request," and seeks comment "on when and how callers should provide such notice."

The FCC also seeks comment on whether callers making covered calls should be required "to record any request to stop calling and provide a record of such a request to subsequent callers along with other information about the debt."

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

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Thursday, August 11, 2016

FYI: 7th Cir Deepens Split on FDCPA Liability for "Time-Barred" Claims

Filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court representing a debt subject to an expired state law limitations period does not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under an opinion released yesterday from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Under the ruling, the Seventh Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's holding under Crawford v. LVNV that such proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion

In this consolidated appeal of three cases, debt purchasers or their attorneys had filed proofs of claims in Chapter 13 cases. The debtors in each Chapter 13 case objected to the proofs of claim on the basis they were "time-barred." The objections were sustained and each claim was disallowed.

Each objecting debtor then sued in federal district court alleging that because the debts represented by the proofs of claim were time-barred, the debts were not valid claims because they were not "legally enforceable." Therefore, the claims filings in the bankruptcy courts amounted to false, unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the FDCPA.

The federal district courts dismissed the complaints, finding that the proofs of claim were complete and accurate and the mere filing of a proof of claim for a debt subject to an expired limitations period did not violate the FDCPA.

"Out of Statute" Debts are Claims

The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Bankruptcy Code only permits "legal enforceable" claims. Finding that the Bankruptcy Code's definition of a claim is broadly construed, the Court pointed to Third Circuit law, which considered a claim "more extensive than the existence of a cause of action that entitles an entity to bring suit." The Bankruptcy Code, the opinion notes, contemplates claims subject to expired state-law limitations periods and, through the bankruptcy process, the debtor can object and cause them to be disallowed.

Bankruptcy Process Provides Protections

The debtors also argued that the process of filing such proofs of claims can be false and deceptive because even though the claims may be subject to disallowance, debt collectors contemplate that no objection will be made because the "process sometimes will break down and fail." This same rationale is behind the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Crawford.

Here the Seventh Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, looked to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Simmons v. Roundup Funding, decided long before Crawford. In Simmons, the Second Circuit held that the mere filing of a proof of claim representing an inflated debt did not violate the FDCPA. The bankruptcy process provides debtors with sufficient protections against, as the Seventh Circuit put it, an "invalid or enforceable" claim. Unlike a civil lawsuit, where the debtor may be misled to believe no defense exists to entry of a judgment and simply "give in," in a bankruptcy case (particularly one where the debtor has counsel, as was the situation in all three of the consolidated cases here), the same concern is not present. The proof of claim must identify the age and the origin of the debt, providing sufficient information to determine whether the debt is subject to an expired limitations period.

Another factor distinguishing the bankruptcy process is the presence of trustees, who are "duty-bound" to object to claims and cause them to be disallowed for a variety of reasons, such as a defense that the claim is past a state-law limitations period.

Finally, unlike a civil lawsuit, because the debtor initiated the bankruptcy process, he "thus demonstrated a willingness to participate" and would be "unlikely to give in rather than fight the claim."

No Evidence of False, Deceptive or Unfair Practices

The Seventh Circuit evaluates communications subject to the FDCPA by not examining how the plaintiff interpreted them, but instead considers how the communication would be interpreted by a hypothetical "unsophisticated consumer." However, because in each of the three bankruptcy cases here the debtors were represented by counsel, the Seventh Circuit employed its less stringent, "competent attorney" standard. Under this standard the Court reasoned that a hypothetical competent attorney was provided all the information required from the face of each of the three proofs of claim to determine whether any were subject to a state-law expired statute of limitations.

Because the proofs of claim would not confuse the hypothetical competent attorney, no evidence was presented that any of the proofs of claim contained deceptive or misleading information or constituted unfair or abusive conduct.

FDCPA Not Precluded by Bankruptcy Code

The opinion notes that it is sympathetic to situations where claims subject to state-law limitations periods are not disallowed and are paid through a Chapter 13 plan because it "harms not only the debtor, who is forced to pay a portion of the stale debt out of limited means, but also creditors with legally enforceable debts whose share of the pie is reduced because an additional creditor is claiming a piece." But that risk did not support a finding of an FDCPA violation here because all three claims were in the bankruptcy process because all the plaintiffs here object to the claims, which were not allowed in their bankruptcy cases.

Further, the opinion does not preclude the FDCPA from the bankruptcy process when debt collectors file proofs of claim "with inaccurate information" or otherwise engage in "deceptive or misleading debt collection practices."

Other Circuits Expected to Weigh in Soon

Appeals on the same issue are pending before the First, Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

Financial Services Law Updates

and

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and

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Wednesday, August 10, 2016

FYI: Annual Consumer Financial Services Conference (Chicago, IL - Sept 15-16, 2016) - HOTEL BLOCK ENDS NEXT TUESDAY

Annual Consumer Financial Services Conference – HOTEL BLOCK ENDS TUESDAY

Governing Committee Members:

If you are attending our upcoming Annual Consumer Financial Services Conference, this is a reminder that the hotel room block at the Whitehall Hotel ends Tuesday, August 16. To make your reservations, call the hotel directly at 312-944-6300 and ask for In-House Reservations. Mention "The Conference on Consumer Finance Law" for the special group rate of $269 + tax per night for September 14 & 15. To receive the special rate, you must make your reservation by phone, not online, by August 16.

If you have not yet registered for the Conference, there is still time. Registration and additional information can be found here: https://www.ccflonline.org/conference/.

The two-day conference will be held at Loyola University Chicago's Law School facility, just off North Michigan Avenue in Chicago, on September 15-16. A copy of the Tentative Agenda can be downloaded here: https://www.ccflonline.org/attachments/ccfl-conference-2016.pdf. Please circulate this to everyone that you think would benefit from attending the Conference.

John L. Ropiequet
Chairman
Conference on Consumer Finance Law

The Conference on Consumer Finance Law
P.O. Box 17981
Clearwater, FL 33762
www.ccflonline.org
ccflstaff@ccflonline.org

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Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

Financial Services Law Updates

and

The Consumer Financial Services Blog™

and

Webinars

and

California Finance Law Developments

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Insurance Recovery Services

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

FYI: Fla App Ct (2nd DCA) Holds Florida "Notice of Assignment of Debt" Not Applicable to Mortgage Lenders or Foreclosures

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, recently reversed a final summary judgment in borrowers' favor, holding that section 559.715 of the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act ("FCCPA") does not apply to the holder of the note and is not an affirmative defense to foreclosure actions because it does not create a condition precedent to an action to foreclose the mortgage and enforce the note.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion

A mortgagee filed a foreclosure action, attaching to the complaint a note and an allonge bearing an indorsement from the original lender in blank, the same day the note and mortgage were signed. The mortgage named MERS as the mortgagee acting as nominee for the original lender.

The mortgagee moved for summary judgment, filing the original note and allonge with blank indorsement along with an assignment of mortgage from MERS to the plaintiff dated a few months prior to the filing of the foreclosure action.

The borrowers filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff mortgagee was not the original lender, and failed to give any notice of assignment supposedly required by section 559.715 of the FCCPA. The borrowers argued that the failure to comply with this condition precedent required summary judgment in their favor.

The trial court granted the borrowers' motion for summary judgment, from which the plaintiff mortgagee appealed.

On appeal, the mortgagee argued that "the trial court erred in concluding that the alleged failure to comply with section 559.715 is a legally sufficient affirmative defense to the filing of its foreclosure action [and that] section 559.715 is inapplicable to its foreclosure action because [it] is not a debt collector for purposes of the [FCCPA] … [and] because the act of filing a foreclosure lawsuit is not debt collection activity for purposes of the FCCPA."

The Appellate Court began its analysis by considering "the express language of the FCCPA and the applicable sections of Florida's Uniform Commercial Code and Title XL of the Florida Statutes."

The Appellate Court noted that section 559.715 states that the FCCPA:

does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt. However, the assignee must give the debtor written notice of such assignment as soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee is the real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default.

Florida Statutes, § 559.715.

The Court went to explain that in a different context it had "implicitly determined that a promissory note secured by a mortgage is a consumer debt for purposes of the FCCPA", in the case at bar it was addressing "the applicability of the section 559.715 to [the mortgagee] based on [its] relationship to the debt, i.e., the note."

The Appellate Court reasoned that the note was a negotiable instrument under Chapter 673 of Florida's UCC and the mortgagee was "entitled to enforce the note not because it is an assignee of the right to bill and collect but because it meets the statutory definition of the holder of the note.

Section 671.201, Florida Statutes (2011), defines "holder" as '[t]he person in possession of a [note] that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession." Accordingly, the Court reasoned, the mortgagee's "possession of the note indorsed in blank is critical to its status as a holder."

The Court then pointed out that "section 550.715 applies only to assignees of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt not to assignees of the debt itself" before concluding that "[s]ection 559.715 requires no action by the creditor or the note holder. It in no way impacts or limits the right of the note holder to file a foreclosure lawsuit. The right of the note holder to enforce the note exists regardless of an assignment to bill an collect the debt. … Concluding that the assignee of the right to bill and collect the debt is the only real party in interest would run afoul of Florida law that the not holder has standing to enforce the note."

The Court relied on its own recent holding that "section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to the filing of a foreclosure lawsuit, even where enforcement of the note is sought." Brindise v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 183 So. 3d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, No. SC16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 (Fla. Mar. 22, 2016).

The Court held that because the mortgagee "was not the assignee of the right to bill and collect the debt ... [but was] the holder of the note at the time the lawsuit was filed," section 559.715 is inapplicable to the mortgagee.

Moreover, the Appellate Court held, this section is not an affirmative defense to a foreclosure action and does not create a condition precedent or in any other way avoids the claims to foreclose a mortgage and enforce a note.

Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment ruling in favor of the borrowers was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile: (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

Financial Services Law Updates

and

The Consumer Financial Services Blog™

and

Webinars

and

California Finance Law Developments

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Insurance Recovery Services

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The Editor's Bio

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
20 N. Clark Street, 33rd Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct: (312) 493-0874
RWutscher@MauriceWutscher.com
https://www.MauriceWutscher.com/

Ralph Wutscher's practice focuses primarily on representing depository and non-depository mortgage lenders and servicers, as well as mortgage loan investors, distressed asset buyers and sellers, loss mitigation companies, automobile and other personal property secured lenders and finance companies, credit card and other unsecured lenders, and other consumer financial services providers. He represents the consumer lending industry as a litigator, and as regulatory compliance counsel.

Ralph has substantial experience in defending private consumer finance lawsuits, including cases ranging from large interstate putative class actions to localized single-asset cases, as well as in responding to regulatory investigations and other governmental proceedings. His litigation successes include not only victories at the trial court level, but also on appeal, and in various jurisdictions. He has successfully defended numerous putative class actions asserting violations of a wide range of federal and state consumer protection statutes. He is frequently consulted to assist other law firms in developing or improving litigation strategies in cases filed around the country.

Ralph also has substantial experience in counseling clients regarding their compliance with federal laws, and with state and local laws primarily of the Midwestern United States. For example, he regularly provides assistance in connection with portfolio or program audits, consumer lending disclosure issues, the design and implementation of marketing and advertising campaigns, licensing and reporting issues, compliance with usury laws and other limitations on pricing, compliance with state and local “predatory lending” laws, drafting or obtaining opinion letters on a single- or multi-state basis, interstate branching and loan production office licensing, evaluations and modifications of new or existing products and procedures, debt collection and servicing practices, proper methods of responding to consumer inquiries and furnishing consumer information, as well as proposed or existing arrangements with settlement service providers and other vendors, and the implementation of procedural or other operational changes following developments in the law.

Ralph is a member of the Governing Committee of the Conference on Consumer Finance Law. He is also the immediate past Chair of the Preemption and Federalism Subcommittee for the ABA's Consumer Financial Services Committee. He served on the Law Committee for the former National Home Equity Mortgage Association, and completed two terms as Co-Chair of the Consumer Credit Committee of the Chicago Bar Association.

Ralph received his Juris Doctor from the University of Illinois College of Law, and his undergraduate degree from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). He is a member of the national Mortgage Bankers Association, the American Bankers Association, the Conference on Consumer Finance Law, DBA International, the ACA International Members Attorney Program, as well as the American and Chicago Bar Associations.

Ralph is admitted to practice in Illinois, as well as in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Illinois, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and has been admitted pro hac vice in various jurisdictions around the country.