Friday, May 17, 2019

FYI: 5th Cir Rules in Lender's Favor in Agricultural Lien Priority Dispute

In an agricultural lien contest between three creditors of a bankrupt commercial farm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of a bank that provided debtor-in-possession financing, holding that the locale of the farm products determined the applicable lien law and that bank's lien was superior to the liens of two nurseries' that supplied trees and shrubs because the latter were either unperfected or unenforceable.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The debtor, "a wholesale grower of trees, shrubs, and other plants, with headquarters in Texas and offices in Michigan, Oregon and Tennessee[,]" filed bankruptcy in June of 2016.

 

Two creditors were commercial nurseries located in Oregon that supplied trees and shrubs to the debtor in return for security interests in the goods sold. Another creditor, a bank headquartered in Pennsylvania, loaned the debtor money in return for a security interest in most of debtor's assets. The bank also provided post-petition debtor-in-possession financing so the debtor could stay in business.

 

The bankruptcy court ordered that the debtor-in-possession financing included the pre-petition loan and that the bank's lien was subordinate only to valid, perfected pre-petition liens.

 

The nurseries sued the bank in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that their liens were superior to the bank's lien. The bank filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the nurseries' liens were unenforceable.

 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted the bank's motion. The nurseries appealed.

 

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first approved the trial court's ruling as to "which choice-of-law analysis should determine the law governing the lien dispute[,]" reasoning that the trial court correctly declined to choose whether bankruptcy courts "should  apply forum or federal choice-of-law rules" because "both would give the same answer[;]" namely, Texas.

 

Under Texas law, "agricultural lien perfection and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where 'farm products are located[,]" which meant Michigan, Tennessee and Oregon, where the products were delivered to the debtor's farms.

 

Turning to the merits, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the nurseries' liens were not perfected and were thus inferior to the bank's lien "due to defective financing statements." The defect was that the debtor's legal name was not exactly reproduced on the financing statements, as required under Michigan and Tennessee law.

 

Addressing the Oregon products, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclusion that one nursery "failed to extend its lien under Oregon law."  Because the nursery's lien was unenforceable, it could not be senior to the bank's lien.

 

The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the trial court's summary judgment ruling in the bank's favor.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

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Wednesday, May 15, 2019

FYI: 11th Cir Splits from Other Circuits on Spokeo Standing

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ("Eleventh Circuit") sua sponte issued a new opinion to vacate and replace its prior opinion affirming approval of a class action settlement against a retailer for alleged violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq. ("FACTA") for printing more digits of his credit card number on a receipt than permitted under the Act.

 

Departing from contrary opinions by other federal appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit's new opinion offers an updated analysis of the plaintiff-appellee consumer's standing to bring the action under Spokeo, holding that the risk of identity theft the consumer suffered was sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing, and also bears a close enough relationship to the common law tort of breach of confidence to make the consumer's injury concrete.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

A consumer ("Consumer") filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against a prominent chocolate retailer ("Merchant") alleging that the store issued him a receipt that showed his credit card number's first six and last four digits after he made a purchase at one of the Merchant's stores.  The Consumer's Complaint sought relief on behalf of himself, and a class of customers under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq. ("FACTA") as a result of the Merchant's allegedly willful violation, which purportedly exposed him and the proposed class "to an elevated risk of identity theft."

 

As you may recall, FACTA prohibits merchants from printing "more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction" (15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)), and allows for recovery of statutory damages even if the customer received and kept the defective receipt and submits no evidence of identity theft or negative impact to their credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a); Engel v. Scully & Scully, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 117, 125–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

 

After the Merchant's motion to dismiss was denied, a preliminary class-wide settlement was reached, which included a $6.3 million settlement fund (providing each class member an estimated $235 as its pro-rata share), a one-third contingency fee of $2.1 million to class counsel, and a $10,000 incentive award to the Consumer as class representative.  The Consumer's motion for preliminary approval addressed potential risks favoring pre-trial settlement, including potential challenges to the class members' Article III standing to pursue their FACTA claims dependent upon the outcome of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), then-pending before the Supreme Court. 

 

The motion for preliminary approval and proposed form notice were granted, and a scheduling order for the class members to file claims, objections or opt-outs was set approximately two-and-a-half weeks prior to the Consumer's deadline to move for final settlement approval, including the requested attorney's fees and incentive award.

 

Of the 318,000 class members who received notice of the settlement, over 47,000 submitted claim forms.  Only fifteen members opted out, including five who objected to the settlement.  Two class members (the "Objecting Class Members") objected to the proposed class-wide settlement, arguing that (i) the Consumer's $10,000 incentive award was not warranted, (ii) the proposed attorney's fee award should be subject to a lodestar analysis, and (iii) notice of the fee motion was inadequate under Rule 23(h).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1) ("[n]otice of the motion [for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs] must be served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner."). 

 

The Consumer subsequently filed the motion for final approval of settlement along with a separate motion for attorneys' fees at the court's direction, and four days later—before the Objecting Class Members field their opposition briefs—the magistrate issued a report and recommendation ("R&R") to approve the class settlement and full attorneys' fees  and incentive awards as proposed.  The Objecting Class Members proceeded with filing their opposition briefs and objections to the magistrate's R&R, which were considered at a fairness hearing before the court, wherein counsel for one of the Objecting Class Members raised a new objection concerning the Consumer's standing under Article III. 

 

Over the Objecting Class Members' objections, the trial court approved the settlement, including the requested attorneys' fees and incentive award, rejecting the Objecting Class Members' argument that notice of the fee motion was not adequate because it had "permitted objections to be filed both before and after" it was filed, and also considered the R&R objections in reaching its conclusion that the fee and incentive awards were reasonable.

 

The Objecting Class Members appealed the final approval of settlement and one of the two appellants further challenged the Consumer's Article III standing to pursue a claim against the Merchant under FACTA on appeal. 

 

The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the Consumer's standing to bring the action under Article III.  This discussion is the court's self-declared "major change" from its previous opinion. 

 

As you may recall, Article III standing to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction requires plaintiffs to show they suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547.  "To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'"  Id. at 1548 (internal quotation omitted). 

 

Whether the Consumer's alleged injury was "particularized" was not at dispute because the heightened risk of identity theft affected him "in a personal and individual way"— it was his credit card number that appeared on the receipt. 

 

Instead, the Objecting Class Member's argument relied upon Spokeo's holding which reaffirmed a "'concrete' injury must be 'de facto'; that is, it must actually exist," (Id. at 1548) to argue that the Consumer lacked standing because the injury was not sufficiently "concrete" to confer standing.  The Consumer argued that his injury was also concrete because he suffered a heightened risk of identity theft when the Merchant printed more digits of his credit card number than allowed under FACTA. 

 

As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, in cases like this, a plaintiff may show injury in fact by alleging "the violation of a procedural right granted by statute" poses a "risk of real harm" to a concrete interest. Id. at 1549. 

 

Here, the Consumer alleged that he suffered a heightened risk of identity theft as a result of the Merchant's FACTA violation—the very interest that Congress sought to protect with FACTA.  A consumer undoubtedly has a concrete interest in preventing his identity from actually being stolen.  See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("Nobody doubts that identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized injury.").  Accepting these allegations as true, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Consumer established a risk of real harm to a concrete interest sufficient to establish standing under Spokeo.

 

The re-issued opinion acknowledges that its declines to follow the Third Circuit's recent ruling in Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019), which rejected a consumer's FACTA claims for the same purported violations as the case at bar for not alleging a concrete article for Article III standing. 

 

However, the Eleventh Circuit contended that its holding here is not inconsistent with other circuits which found no standing in similar claims under FACTA pertaining to inclusion of a credit card expiration date on receipts, and is distinguishable because those opinions rely on Congress's finding in The Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 (the "Clarification Act"), that "a receipt with a credit card expiration date does not raise a material risk of identity theft."  See Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018); CruparWeinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the legislative history of the Clarification Act reflects Congress's view that printing more than the last five digits of a credit card number contributes to the problem of identity theft because the Act left only limited liability for printing expiration dates in drafting the Clarification Act, and specifically found that FACTA's truncation requirement "prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity theft or credit card fraud."  For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress judged the risk of identity theft suffered by the Consumer to be sufficiently concrete to confer standing to raise his FACTA claims.

 

Separately, the Court held, the Consumer could show standing based on the similarity between the alleged harm and the common law tort of breach of confidence.  Spokeo at 1549 (describing it as "instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts"). 

 

A common law breach of confidence involves the offer a person's private information to a third party in confidence who reveals that information, and occurs when the plaintiff's trust in the breaching party is violated, whether or not the breach has other consequences (citations omitted). 

 

Here, because the Merchant printed more numbers of the Consumer's credit card than allowed under statute, it created a heightened risk that information the Consumer entrusted to it would become disclosed to the public — a risk the Eleventh Circuit concluded bears a close enough relationship to the disclosure of confidential information actionable at common law for breach of confidence to satisfy Article III under Spokeo. 

 

Although the Third Circuit's opinion in Kamal 918 F.3d at 114 rejected this case's original opinion that breach of confidence is sufficiently analogous to give rise to standing, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it has consistently read Spokeo to mean that, where the common law allowed a cause of action to remedy an injury, Congress can create a statutory cause of action to remedy the risk of such an injury.  Accordingly, it concluded that the Consumer suffered a concrete injury, and has standing to bring this action.

 

Lastly, in addressing the Objecting Class Members' remaining arguments concerning approval of the class settlement, the Eleventh Circuit held that although the trial court erred by setting an objection deadline before a filed motion for attorney's fees, the Objecting Class Members were not prejudiced because their arguments were adequately considered by the magistrate and the court.  

 

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its attorney's fees and incentive awards because (i) a lodestar analysis was not appropriate because the attorneys' fees were sought from a common fund, rather than a fee-shifting statute, and the above-benchmark award properly assessed risks faced by the class and its counsel, and; (ii) the incentive award was supported by the district court's record, which stated that the Consumer subjected himself to inconvenience and delays that did not materialize, but were a possibility when he was appointed to represent the class.

 

Accordingly, the trial court's approval of the class-action settlement was affirmed.

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

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Monday, May 13, 2019

FYI: 6th Cir BAP Holds Ohio Law Did Not Invalidate Lien When Non-Borrower Spouse Signed Mtg But Not Note

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit BAP") recently affirmed a lower bankruptcy court's ruling that a refinanced mortgage was enforceable as to the interests of both husband and wife, where the wife did not execute the note and was not defined as a "borrower" in the body of the mortgage, but nonetheless initialed and signed the mortgage document as a "borrower" in the signature block.

 

In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit BAP considered the Ohio Supreme Court's answers to two certified questions stating that failing to identify a signatory by name in the body of the mortgage did not render the agreement invalid or unenforceable against the signatory's in rem rights as a matter of law, along with the language of the mortgage itself, to conclude that the lower bankruptcy court properly admitted parole evidence of the parties' intent in executing the mortgage, and the lower bankruptcy court did not err in entering judgment determining that the mortgage encumbered both the husband and wife's interests in the property.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

A husband and wife executed a purchase money mortgage agreement secured by real property (the "Property") and identifying both the husband and wife as "Borrowers."

 

In February 2007, the original purchase money mortgage was refinanced, but only the husband executed and delivered the promissory note to the lender, and the wife was not listed as a "borrower" on the document.  On the same date, both husband and wife executed a mortgage in connection with the refinancing (the "Mortgage").  Although the wife initialed each page of the Mortgage and signed as "Borrower" on the signature page, the husband was the only defined "Borrower" in the body of the Mortgage.  The mortgage was later assigned to a different company ("Mortgagee").

 

In September 2014, husband and wife filed a joint chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which identified them as joint tenants with rights of survivorship to the Property. 

 

The chapter 7 trustee subsequently ("Trustee") filed an adversary complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the wife's interest in the Property was not encumbered the Mortgage because only her husband was named as a "Borrower" in the body of the Mortgage. 

 

Due to the ambiguous nature of the Mortgage, the bankruptcy court considered parole evidence to determine the parties' intent in executing the Mortgage, and following a trial, a Judgment Order was entered holding that the Mortgage fully encumbered both the husband and wife's interests in the Property.  The Trustee appealed.

 

Given conflicting opinions among federal and Ohio state courts, the Sixth Circuit BAP certified two questions to the Ohio Supreme Court to answer two unsettled questions of state law:

 

(1) whether an individual who is not identified in the body of a mortgage, but who signs and initials the mortgage is a mortgagor of his or her interest, and;

 

(2) is a mortgage signed and initialed by an individual whose name is not identified in the body of the mortgage, but whose signature is properly acknowledged pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5301, invalid as a matter of law such that parole evidence is not admissible to determine the intent of the individual in signing the mortgage?

 

The Ohio Supreme Court answered the certified questions by ruling: (1) that failure to identify a signatory by name within the body of the mortgage did not render the agreement unenforceable against the signatory's in rem rights, and; (2) that when signed, initialed and acknowledged by a signatory not named within the document itself, the mortgage is not invalid as a matter of law; thus, parole evidence is admissible to determine intent when ambiguities are present.  Bank of New York Mellon v. Rhierl, No. 2018-Ohio-5081, 2018 WL 6778145 at *1, *45-5 (Dec. 20, 2018); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1335.03 (signature of a party itself makes a contract enforceable, rather than other methods of identification within the contract itself) (case law citations omitted).

 

While emphasizing the signature requirement of a contract, the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion also discussed the importance of consideration, and that a party's intent cannot be found by a signature alone—language within the document could limit a party's capacity and willingness to encumber certain property. 

 

Thus, in considering the contractual terms as whole to determine a party's intent to be bound by contract, even if a signatory is not described within the body of the document, he or she is acting as a mortgagor absent any language within the mortgage that negates this presumption.  Rhiel at *4 (internal citations omitted).

 

In supplemental briefing before the Sixth Circuit BAP, the appellant Trustee argued that the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling only held that it is possible for a person who signs, but is not named in a mortgage to pledge their property interest to the mortgagee only if the mortgage as a whole evinces that persons' intent to be bound, and as noted in a dissenting opinion from the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling, there was no such conveyance language pertaining to her within the Mortgage. 

 

In addition, and notwithstanding the Ohio Supreme Court's holdings, the Trustee further argued that the bankruptcy court erred in permitting parole evidence and submitted case law from other states, including Massachusetts and Kentucky, along with prior decisions applying Ohio law to show that other bankruptcy courts have held that a person who signs a mortgage has not encumbered their share of the property if not defined as a "Borrower" within the body of the mortgage itself (case law citations omitted).

 

The appellee Mortgagee argued that the Supreme Court's answers to the certified questions are binding precedent, and Trustee could not use the dissenting opinion as a basis for reversal.

 

With the benefit of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion answering the certified questions and independent review of the Mortgage, the Sixth Circuit BAP concurred with the bankruptcy court's findings that the Mortgage was ambiguous, as the text of the document suggests that the husband alone was the "Borrower," but the wife's signature and initial suggest that she also pledged her interest in the Property as "Borrower." 

 

This term was susceptible to two competing, reasonable interpretations with respect to the identity of the mortgagor(s) and extent of property liable for the Note.  Thus, the bankruptcy court's decision to consider parole evidence was correct.

 

At trial the bankruptcy court considered depositions, affidavits, other income-property transactions and testimony, along with consideration that the husband and wife both mortgaged their interests in the Property when obtaining the original purchase money mortgage to concluded that the Mortgage encumbered both of their interests in their joint tenancy.  It also considered the fact that the lender's agent who prepared the closing documents prepared explicit instructions for the closing agent to require both husband and wife to sign the Mortgage, and the wife did so as instructed. 

 

In addition, the Court noted, the Mortgage itself appeared to recognize that "any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a 'co-signer'): (a) is co-signing this Security instrument only to mortgage, grant and covey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the terms of this Security Instrument…"  and contained no language that the refinancing lender intended to take a first mortgage in only half the Property.  Lastly, the bankruptcy court found no evidence to suggest that the wife signed the Mortgage only to release her dower rights as she claimed, and the Property's description in the Mortgage.

 

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit BAP found no clear error in the bankruptcy court's factual finding that the husband and wife intended to encumber their entire interest in the Property by signing the Mortgage to secure refinancing of their loan, and affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling in favor of the Mortgagee.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


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Financial Services Law Updates

 

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and

 

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