Friday, February 2, 2018

FYI: Cal App (4th Dist) Affirms Denial of Class Cert For Lack of Evidence Identifying Putative Class Members

The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District recently affirmed an order denying class certification because the plaintiff did not present evidence to demonstrate that the how putative class members can be identified from the defendant's records.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

In July 2013, the plaintiff purchased an inflatable kids pool from a retail vendor.  The plaintiff based his decision to purchase the pool on the pool's packaging, which showed a photograph of a group of three adults and two children sitting and playing in the pool.  The plaintiff assumed the pool would be large enough to comfortably fit a group of equivalent size.  The box displayed the pool's dimensions: "8FT X 25IN".

 

The plaintiff discovered that the pool was "materially smaller" than the pool shown on the packaging.  Rather than fitting two adults and three children as pictured on the box, the pool was only capable of fitting one adult and four small children. 

 

In November 2013, the plaintiff filed this class action and alleged that the vendor violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. ("CLRA"), Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Unfair Competition Law or "UCL"), and Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 (False Advertising Law or "FAL"), by selling the pool with deceptive advertising to consumers in its California retail stores.

 

As you may recall, the CLRA protects consumers against deceptive business practices in the sale of goods and prohibits a seller from representing that goods have characteristic they do not possess.  Civ. Code §  1770(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(7).  The UCL prohibits acts of unfair competition, defined as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice".  Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.  The FAL is equally comprehensive within the smaller and narrower field of false advertising.  Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.

 

The plaintiff sought restitution for all consumers who purchased the pool from the vendor located in California the four years prior to that date. 

 

In opposing the motion for class certification, the vendor submitted to the court a photograph of the pool properly inflated and filled, which appeared much closer to the size of the pool depicted on the box.  The photo submitted by the vendor showed three adults and two children in the pool.  The vendor's photo was accompanied by the declaration of an expert in photogrammetric analysis and photo interpretation, concluding that the plaintiff had not set up the pool properly. 

 

The plaintiff's deposition testimony reflected his belief that he had set up the pool properly, and the trial court accepted that testimony as true. 

 

However, the trial court found that the plaintiff presented "no evidence" to establish "what method or methods will be utilized to identify the class members, what records are available, (either from the [vendor], the manufacturer, or other entities such as banks or credit institutions), how those records would be obtained, what those records will show, and how burdensome their production would be."  The trial court also found "a class action is not superior to numerous individual actions" and "will be no more efficient than individual actions in light of the individual issues [sic] that must be presented on the issue of reliance and damages."

 

Additionally, due to the stricter proof requirements under the CLRA, the trial court found that the plaintiff had not shown the commonality of issues required for the CLRA. 

 

Because the plaintiff did not satisfy the class ascertainability and superiority requirements, the trial court denied the motion for class certification on all three causes of action.

 

On appeal, the plaintiff raised two arguments.

 

First, the plaintiff argued that trial court errored in denying his motion on the UCL and FAL causes of action, because he satisfied the class ascertainability requirement for certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. 

 

Second, he argued that the trial court's statement that the packing must be "materially misleading as a matter of law" to show common issues of reliance and causation for the CLRA was legally incorrect.

 

Two class action statutes were at issue. 

 

The first, Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which governed class actions generally, including actions under the UCL and FAL.  Under section 382, a certification motion may be granted where there was "an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members."  Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326. 

 

Courts determine the existence of an ascertainable class using three factors: (1) class definition, (2) class size, and (3) means of identifying class members.  Sotelo v. Medianews Group, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 639, 648.  The community of interest inquiry depended on three criteria: (1) whether common issues predominate over individual issues; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims are typical of the class he or she seeks to represent; and (3) whether the plaintiff is an adequate class representative.  Id. at 651.

 

The CLRA contained its own provisions for class actions, similar in many respects to the requirements just cited, under which a court must certify a class when: "(1) [i]t is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court. (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.  (3) The claims and defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.  [and] (3) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."  Civ. Code § 1781(b).

 

The Appellate Court began its analysis by reviewing the plaintiff's evidence for ascertaining the identities of the putative class members. 

 

The plaintiff insisted that the class was ascertainable because the class definition was clear and simple:  "All persons who purchased the Ready Set Pool at a [vendor's] store located in California within the four years preceding the date of the filing of this action."  However, the Appellate Court explained that the class definition was not the issue.  Rather, the issue was the lack of business records through which to identify the class members, and plaintiff did not suggest a realistic method by which the class members might be identified. 

 

The plaintiff pointed to the vendor's interrogatory responses relating to the number of pools sold (20,752), the number of pools returned (2,479), and the vendor's gross revenue from sale of the pool ($949,279.34), but submitted nothing offering insight into who purchased the pools or how one might find that out.  The plaintiff did not describe or produce the vendor's records from which these numbers were derived, and he did not indicate how much other information these records might reveal. 

 

The Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff was not required to actually identify the 20,000-plus individuals who bought pools.  However, he had the burden to come up with any legitimate means of identifying the class members.  The plaintiff merely hypothesized that class members could be notified through the vendor's rewards program or email lists, without explaining, much less proving, how many cross-referencing between the class members' transactions and the names on those lists might be achieved to allow for personal notice.  In the Appellate Court's view, these under-inclusive or over-inclusive lists may not result in notice to the "vast majority" of class members as required for due process.

 

Because the likelihood of receiving notice decreases with fewer putative class members, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court may exercise its discretion and require personal notice based upon the stake for each individual class member and the size of the class. 

 

Thus, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a means to identify and give notice to the putative class.

 

Next, the plaintiff argued that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard under the CLRA in determining that the class claims did not predominate over the individual claims.

 

As you may recall, "to obtain relief under the CLRA, both the named plaintiff and the unnamed class members must have suffered some damage caused by a practice deemed unlawful under" that act.  Steroid Hormone Product Cases (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 145, 156.

 

The trial court reasoned that some members of the class may not have relied on the photograph on the box in purchasing their pools, and might instead have relied on the advertised 8" x 25" size of the poll, which was also displayed on the box.  The trial court concluded it would need to find materiality of the photograph "as a matter of law" before it would be required to certify the class under the CLRA. 

 

The plaintiff argued that the trial court's ruling would, in effect, require him to prove the merits of his CLRA claim, which was not required at the certification stage.  However, the Appellate Court found that because the merits of his claims were intertwined with issues pertinent to class certification, there was no error in considering the vendor's evidence insofar as relevant to the question raised by the class certification motion. 

 

In other words, as the Appellate Court explained, the trial court's ruling did not require the plaintiff to prove the merits of his cause of action.  Rather, the ruling was an evidence-based prediction that disputed issues at trial were more likely to be individual than common. 

 

Therefore, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that class issues predominated over individual issues on the CLRA claim. 

 

Finally, the plaintiff argued that trial court should have granted a continuance to allow him to take additional discovery regarding what records the vendor kept or how the purchasers of the pools could be identified through those records. 

 

However, the Appellate Court did not find anything in the record showing that the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to conduct discovery before moving for class certification.  In fact, the Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff could have withdrawn his motion if he concluded insufficient discovery had been conducted, or if he did not have time to prepare for the hearing. 

 

Because the plaintiff was responsible for the timing of the motion, the Appellate Court concluded that the it was not an abuse of discretion to require the plaintiff to prove facts necessary to certify the class.

 

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the order denying class certification and denying a continuance of the taking of further discovery.  

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

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Wednesday, January 31, 2018

FYI: Ill App (2nd Dist) Rules Factual Question Precluded Summary Judgment in HUD/FHA F2F Challenge

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District recently concluded that two borrowers failed to rebut the foreclosing mortgagee's prima facie case of standing to pursue foreclosure against borrowers, and affirmed the trial court's determination that plaintiff mortgagee established as a matter of law that it had standing. 

 

The Second District, however, reversed the trial court's order of summary judgment by concluding there were issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff complied with HUD's face-to-face interview requirement at 24 C.F.R. § 203.604. 

 

As to the standing issue, the Second District held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of standing by establishing that it possessed the note that was endorsed in blank.  The borrowers offered no substantive evidence to the contrary and they could not rely on circumstantial inferences. 

 

With regard to compliance with section 203.604, the Second District held there were issues of fact as to whether the letter to borrowers had been "dispatched," as required under 203.604(d).  Accordingly, the Second District reversed the summary judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale, and remanded the matter to the trial court to address the issues of fact related to section 203.604.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

On January 2, 2014, the plaintiff mortgagee, the trustee for the asset securitization trust, filed its complaint to foreclose a mortgage on property owned by borrowers. The plaintiff mortgagee identified the original mortgagee and attached a copy of the subject mortgage. In support of its claim to be the current mortgagee, the plaintiff mortgagee attached a copy of a note. The note bore two indorsements. The first was an indorsement from the original mortgagee to a previous mortgage servicer. The second was a blank indorsement from that mortgage servicer. Neither indorsement was dated.

 

The borrowers asserted two affirmative defenses.  Their first affirmative defense was that plaintiff lacked standing because the indorsements on the note were inadequate to show that plaintiff held the debt when it filed its complaint. The second defense was that plaintiff failed to comply with section 203.604, which you may recall requires for FHA loans that the mortgagee have, or reasonably attempt to have, a face-to-face meeting with borrowers before seeking foreclosure.

 

The plaintiff mortgagee subsequently moved for summary judgment, attaching several documents to its motion. First, the mortgagee attached multiple affidavits from a foreclosure supervisor with the current mortgage servicer. The affidavits were all dated in 2015. According to the supervisor, the servicer was currently servicing borrowers' loan on behalf of plaintiff and it had "acquired the servicing rights for [the] loan on 09/16/13."  The affidavits also stated that, in April 2012, the mortgagee's agents "visited the subject property" in an attempt to have a face-to-face meeting with borrowers.

 

The affidavits also attached a copy of an April 2012 letter addressed to borrowers at the subject property. The sender was the then mortgage servicer. The letter advised borrowers that a representative from the servicer would attempt to visit borrowers regarding their loan. The affidavits also attached what was claimed to be "a copy of the FedEx Label for the package in which the letter was sent."  The label was computer-generated and showed a "ship date" of April 20, 2012.

 

In addition to the affidavits, plaintiff attached copies of two assignments of the subject mortgage. The first was an August 15, 2013, assignment from a prior mortgage servicer to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), and the second assignment was a January 16, 2014, assignment from HUD to plaintiff.

 

The borrowers responded to the motion for summary judgment by contending that the August 2013 assignment to HUD raised an issue of material fact whether plaintiff owned the debt on January 2, 2014, when it filed its complaint.

 

The borrowers also asserted that a genuine question of fact existed as to plaintiff's compliance with section 203.604(d) because, according to the mortgagee's affidavits, the April 2012 letter was sent by Federal Express when section 203.604(d) expressly provides that the letter offering a face-to-face meeting should be sent through the United States Postal Service.

 

The borrowers attached an affidavit from one of the borrowers who asserted she had never received a certified letter by mail from plaintiff, or anyone acting on the mortgagee's behalf, or been offered a face-to-face meeting.

 

The trial court granted summary judgment for the mortgagee, and entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The borrowers filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied.

 

Subsequently, the mortgagee purchased the subject property at a judicial sale and moved the court to approve the sale.  The borrowers filed an objection. They attached documentation showing that the August 2013 assignment of the subject mortgage to HUD was recorded on January 23, 2014, several days after plaintiff instituted the foreclosure proceeding. The trial court rejected borrowers' arguments and entered an order confirming the sale.  The borrowers appealed.

 

The Second District first addressed borrowers' standing defense.  According to the Court, it has been long accepted that possession of the note, indorsed in blank, is sufficient to establish standing absent evidence to the contrary.  And, it was well-settled that attaching a copy of the note to the foreclosure complaint is prima facie evidence plaintiff owns the note.

 

The borrowers offered no evidence to support their conclusory arguments.  The Second District first rejected the borrowers' argument that the plaintiff was required to produce the original note, holding that "[f]or over 25 years, the [Illinois Mortgage] Foreclosure Law has been interpreted as not requiring plaintiff' production of the original note, nor any specific documentation demonstrating that it owns the note or the right to foreclose on the mortgage, other than the copy of the mortgage and note attached to the complaint."

 

Next, the Appellate Court also rejected the borrowers' argument that the dates of the mortgage assignments implied plaintiff did not possess the note at the time the complaint was filed. Specifically, the borrowers alleged that the August 2013 assignment of the subject mortgage to HUD created an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff could have possessed mortgage in January of 2014 when the complaint was filed.  The mortgagee responded by asserting that the affidavits used in support of the motion for summary judgment established plaintiff possessed the note when the complaint was filed.

 

The Second District concluded that the plaintiff's standing was established as a matter of law, irrespective of what was contained in the affidavits.  The Court noted that the "[Borrowers] fail to appreciate the force of the blank indorsement. The presumption of ownership conferred by the indorsement meant that plaintiff could sue on the note without setting forth its history. [Borrowers], rather, had the burden of providing as much of that history as necessary to demonstrate that the transfer of the note did not occur before the complaint was filed."  Because the borrowers had not introduced any evidence to contradict the presumption of ownership, their argument failed.

 

The Court noted, "[a]ssuming arguendo that the August 15, 2013, assignment conveyed the subject debt to HUD, it simply did not rebut the possibility that plaintiff became the owner of that debt sometime between August 15, 2013, and January 2, 2014, whether from HUD or another entity in the chain of ownership. Even the recording of the August 2013 assignment as late as January 23, 2014, did not rebut plaintiff's ownership of the debt on January 2nd."

 

Finally, the Second District rejected the borrowers' argument that the January 16, 2014 assignment of mortgage from HUD to plaintiff created an issue of fact.  "We agree with plaintiff that it is plausibly explained as a memorialization of a prior transfer of the note to plaintiff."

 

Turning its attention to the issue of whether the plaintiff mortgagee complied with section 203.604, the Appellate Court concluded there were issues of fact to preclude summary judgment. 

 

As you may recall, section 203.604(b) requires that "[t]he mortgagee must have a face-to-face interview with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting, before three full monthly installments due on the mortgage are unpaid." 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b). 

 

"A reasonable effort to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the mortgagor" has two elements. 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(d).  First, it "shall consist at a minimum of one letter sent to the mortgagor certified by the Postal Service as having been dispatched." Second, it "shall also include at least one trip to see the mortgagor at the mortgaged property."

 

The borrowers argued that sending the letter via Federal Express, instead of "the Postal Service" failed to comply with the requirements of 203.604(d).  The Appellate Court, however, did not take issue with whether the use of FedEx substantially complied with section 203.604(d).  Instead, the Court concluded that issues of fact existed as to whether the letter was "dispatched," as required. 

 

The only evidence the plaintiff mortgagee offered in support of sending the letter was a shipping label that included a shipping date and tracking number.  The plaintiff mortgagee did not offer anything to show that the letter was actually sent with the delivery, and the Second District recognized that shipping labels can be created and printed without ever being used.

 

"In short, a shipping label - complete with shipping date and tracking number -can be generated independently of actual shipment. …The shipping label does not demonstrate conclusively that plaintiff sent [borrowers] a letter offering a face-to-face meeting."  In the absence of any proof the letter was actually shipped or received, according to the Court, summary judgment was not appropriate.

 

In addition, the Second District also rejected the plaintiff mortgagee's argument that noncompliance with section 203.604 may be excused in cases of inevitable foreclosure.  According to the Appellate Court, the only case that had reached that conclusion did so on the basis of an Illinois statute. In the absence of additional support for that argument on a federal regulation, the Court rejected the mortgagee's argument.

 

Accordingly, the Second District vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further evaluation.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC   |   Wisconsin

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


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