Wednesday, October 20, 2010

FYI: 9th Cir Says Enormity of Classwide Liability Is NOT Valid Reason to Deny Class Cert

In a FACTA credit card receipt truncation case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the district court's denial of class certification for alleged violations of FACTA/FCRA, holding that whether class treatment would render the magnitude of a defendant's liability enormous is not an appropriate reason to deny class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
 
 
The plaintiff filed a complaint against a movie theater chain (AMC) on behalf of himself and those individuals similarly situated, alleging violations of FACTA.  The plaintiff alleged that from December 2006 to January 2007, AMC issued credit and debit card receipts from some of its automated box offices that included both the first four and the last four digits of the credit card, an alleged violation of FACTA.  The district court denied class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), finding that a class action was not the superior method of litigating the case because AMC had made a good faith effort to comply with FACTA after this lawsuit was filed and the magnitude of AMC's potential liability was enormous and out of proportion to any harm suffered by the class.
 
As you may recall, FACTA requires that credit and debit card receipts issued to consumers not reflect the expiration date or more than the last five digits of the card number.  FACTA incorporates the FCRA statutory damages provision which allows a consumer to recover damages between $100 and $1,000 for each willful violation of FACTA without having to prove actual damages.
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on appeal, determining that none of the three grounds—the disproportionality between the potential liability and the actual harm suffered, the enormity of the potential damages, or AMC's good faith compliance—justified the denial of class certification on superiority grounds and the district court abused its discretion in relying on them.
 
The Court held that Rule 23(b) does not permit consideration of whether liability would be "completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by Plaintiff" when deciding whether to certify a class in a FACTA case.  The Court noted that the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority analysis must be consistent with the Congressional intent in enacting a particular statutory damages provision.
 
The Court looked to FACTA itself for evidence of Congressional intent as to the appropriateness of class certification, and noted that although FACTA was amended in 2008 with the Clarification Act, however neither FACTA nor the Clarification Act address the availability of class actions.  The court recited that where a statute is silent on the availability of class relief, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts presume it to be available in all "civil actions brought in federal court."  Accordingly, as neither FACTA nor the Clarification Act contain a "direct expression" to the contrary, the Court determined it must presume that Congress intended class relief to be available.
 
The Court also held that denying class certification on the grounds that certification of a class would threaten to impose liability disproportionate to the harm caused is not consistent with Congressional intent.  The Court noted that Congress expressly created a statutory damages scheme that intended to compensate individuals for actual or potential damages resulting from FACTA violations, without requiring individuals to prove actual harm.  The Court also noted that the plain text of FACTA makes absolutely clear that in Congress's judgment, the $100 to $1000 range is proportionate and appropriately compensates the consumer, but that proportionality does not change as more plaintiffs seek relief. 
 
The court also noted that despite Congress's awareness of the availability of class actions, it set no cap on the total amount of aggregate damages, no limit on the size of a class, and no limit on the number of individual suits that could be brought against a merchant.   The court did not agree with the defense argument that language in the "Findings" Section of the Clarification Action provided evidence of Congress's approval of court rulings that denied class certification.  The Court stated that "[had] Congress been sufficiently concerned about disproportionate damages as a result of class actions, it would have limited class availability or aggregate damages."
 
The Court held that consideration of whether class treatment would render the magnitude of a defendant's liability enormous is not an appropriate reason to deny class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  The Court also concluded that allowing consideration of the potential enormity of any damages award would undermine the compensatory and deterrent purposes of FACTA and would subvert congressional intent.  The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court's consideration of AMC's post-complaint good faith compliance was inconsistent with Congressional intent in enacting FACTA.  Congress did not include any safe harbor or otherwise limit damages for good faith compliance with the statute after an alleged violation.
 
The Court reserved judgment as to whether a showing of "ruinous liability" (otherwise known as "annihilating damages") would warrant denial of class certification in a FCRA or similar action.  The Court also reserved judgment as to whether the district court may be entitled to reduce the award if it is unconstitutionally excessive if the plaintiff prevails at trial.   The Court also noted that nothing in the opinion should be construed to limit  the district court's ability to consider other Rule 23 factors, including the manageability of a nationwide class, in deciding whether class certification is appropriate.
 
The district court's order denying class certification was vacated and the case was remanded.
 
Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Michelle Druce

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (503) 425-9698  

Fax:  (866) 581-9302

MDruce@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com

 

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

RE: 11th Cir Reconsiders, Says CAFA Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does NOT Require At Least One Putative Class Member Meets $75k Amount in Controversy

Staing that "[s]ubsequent reflection has led us to conclude that our [prior] interpretation was incorrect," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and replaced its previous ruling (discussed below), now holding that CAFA's text does not require at least one plaintiff in a class action to meet the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

A copy of the opinion is available at: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200914107op2.pdf

Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320 

Fax:  (866) 581-9302
Mobile:  (312) 493-0874

RWutscher@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com

 



From: Ralph T. Wutscher [mailto:rwutscher@kw-llp.com]
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2010 2:21 PM
To: Ralph Wutscher
Cc: SoCalOffice; D.C. Office; Chicago Office
Subject: FYI: 11th Cir Says No CAFA Subject Matter Jurisdiction Unless At Least One Putative Class Member Meets $75k Amount in Controversy

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's class action suit originated in that court and brought under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") where the plaintiff failed to allege that at least one class member had an amount in controversy greater than $75,000.  A copy of the opinion is attached. 

           

The plaintiff filed a putative class action in federal court against DirectTV, Inc. ("DirectTV"), alleging that DirectTV violated Georgia state common law by charging fees to subscribers when they canceled their subscriptions early.  Plaintiff invoked the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), which incorporates CAFA's provisions.  DirectTV moved the district court to compel Plaintiff to submit to arbitration pursuant to the subscriber agreements and, alternatively, to dismiss the claim for damages for failure to state a claim.

 

The district court denied DirectTV's motion to compel arbitration, but granted its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Upon DirectTV's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA, vacated its order, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.

 

According to the Eleventh Circuit, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a class action brought under CAFA and originated in federal court if:  1) the "amount in controversy [is] over $5,000,000, obtained by aggregating the claims of the individual class members;  2) there is "minimal diversity" between the parties;  3) the class action is "filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23";  4) the plaintiff alleges "that there are 100 or more plaintiffs within the proposed class(es)";  and 5) at least one of the plaintiffs alleges "an amount in controversy that satisfies the current congressional requirement for diversity jurisdiction provided in 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)."

           

Addressing the last requirement, the Court reasoned that, while 28 U.S.C. §1332(d) "may have altered § 1332(a) to require only minimal diversity in CAFA actions…there is no evidence of congressional intent in § 1332(d) to obviate § 1332(a)'s $ 75,000 requirement as to at least one plaintiff." 

 

In the case before it, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged the first four elements of a class action under CAFA.  However, no class member alleged an amount in controversy over $75,000 and therefore the plaintiff lacked a "basis for invoking the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA."
 
Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320 

Fax:  (866) 581-9302
Mobile:  (312) 493-0874

RWutscher@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com

 

 

 The information transmitted (including attachments) is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, is intended only for the person(s) or entity/entities to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.  Notice Under U.S. Treasury Department Circular 230: To the extent that this e-mail communication and the attachment(s) hereto, if any, may contain written advise concerning or relating to a Federal (U.S.) tax issue, United States Treasury Department Regulations (Circular 230) require that we (and we do hereby) advise and disclose to you that, unless we expressly state otherwise in writing, such tax advise is not written or intended to be used, and cannot be used by you (the addressee) or other person(s), for purposes of (1) avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or (2) promoting, marketing or recommending to any other person(s) the (or any of the) transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed, discussed or referenced herein. Each taxpayer should seek advice from an independent tax advisor with respect to any Federal tax issue(s), transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed, discussed or referenced herein based upon his, her or its particular circumstances.  

FYI: Maryland Fed Ct Dismisses "Subprime Nuisance" Case Against Wells Fargo, But Grants Leave to Amend

Judge J. Frederick Motz of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland recently granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in the "subprime nuisance" case against Wells Fargo.  However, the court also granted the City of Baltimore leave to file a third amended complaint.
 
A copy of the court's letter opinion is attached.
 
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore brought this action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. under the federal Fair Housing Act, alleging that Wells Fargo's supposed predatory and discriminatory lending practices led to foreclosures that harmed the City of Baltimore. 
 
The court found that the City failed to allege causal connection between Wells Fargo's lending and the alleged damages to the City, as required.  The court noted that it was reluctant to grant the City leave to file a third amended complaint because it may well be that the damages (if any) that the City might eventually be awarded would be extremely limited. 
 
However, the court indicated that an analysis of the issues persuaded the court that theoretically the City does have viable claims, if it can prove property specific injuries inflicted upon it at properties that would not have been vacant but for improper loans made by Wells Fargo.  The court stated that it was in the interest of justice that the City be granted leave to file a third amended complaint.
Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Michelle Druce

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (503) 425-9698  

Fax:  (866) 581-9302

MDruce@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com

 

 

FYI: 11th Cir Allows FTC to Levy Against Florida Defendant's Non-Party Single-Member LLC Interest

In an action by the FTC against an advance-fee credit card provider, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently concluded that a court may order a judgment-debtor to surrender all "right, title, and interest" in a debtor's non-party single-member LLC to satisfy a judgment creditor's claims.
 
 
The defendants allegedly operated an advance-fee credit card scam that created an impression consumers could receive a "platinum" credit card like a VISA or MasterCard in exchange for payment of $45 or $49.  Instead, consumers received a platinum colored card usable only for purchasing products from the defendants.  Over ten million solicitations were mailed to consumers.
 
The FTC filed an action alleging violations of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices.  The district court granted the FTC's motion for summary judgment, entering a judgment for injunctive relief and for more than $10 million in restitution against the defendants.  The defendants' assets, including several Florida LLCs in which the individual defendants were the sole member, were frozen and placed in receivership. 
 
The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment but did not seek a stay of execution.  The FTC moved to compel defendants to surrender their membership interests in their non-party single member LLCs to the receiver.  Defendants objected, arguing that the FTC only has the rights of an assignee under Florida law.  
 
The defendants argued that the surrender order was contrary to Florida's LLC Act and that a charging order is the only remedy that a judgment-creditor may obtain against the membership interest of an LLC member, even if that member is the sole member of the LLC because of the plain language of Florida's LLC Act.  No earlier Florida case had directly addressed the application of Fla. Stat. Section 608.433 (4) to single-member LLCs.
 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, to address state-law issues of judgment-debtor liability in light of Florida's LLC Act. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Florida law permits a court to order a judgment-debtor to surrender all right, title, and interest in the debtor's single-member LLC to satisfy an outstanding judgment.  The court explained that the charging-order remedy provided by Section 608.433(4) does not establish the exclusive remedy for judgment-creditors of single-member LLCs.  The court stated "[w]here an LLC has only one member, no need exists to protect the interests of other members by restricting judgment-creditors to a charging-order remedy.  So, a judgment-creditor is not barred from pursuing the remedy available under section 56.601, which allows a court to levy upon a defendant's interest in stock in a corporation, including a membership interest in an LLC."
 
Accordingly, the district court's order compelling the defendants to surrender all "right, title, and interest" in their single-member LLCs was affirmed.
 
Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Michelle Druce

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (503) 425-9698  

Fax:  (866) 581-9302

MDruce@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com

 

 

FYI: FRB Issues Interim Final Rule to Replace HVCC

The Federal Reserve Board issued for public comment an interim final rule to replace HVCC, in order to implement new requirements for appraisal independence for consumer credit transactions secured by the consumer's principal dwelling, as required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

 

The full text of the interim final rule is available at:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20101018a1.pdf

 

The interim final rule is designed to:  (1) ensure that real estate appraisals used to support creditors' underwriting decisions are based on the appraiser's independent professional judgment, free of any influence or pressure that may be exerted by parties that have an interest in the transaction; and  (2) ensure that creditors and their agents pay only customary and reasonable fees to appraisers.

 

More specifically, the interim final rule:

  • Prohibits coercion and other similar actions designed to cause appraisers to base the appraised value of properties on factors other than their independent judgment;
  • Prohibits appraisers and appraisal management companies hired by lenders from having financial or other interests in the properties or the credit transactions;
  • Prohibits creditors from extending credit based on appraisals if they know beforehand of violations involving appraiser coercion or conflicts of interest, unless the creditors determine that the values of the properties are not materially misstated;
  • Requires that creditors or settlement service providers that have information about appraiser misconduct file reports with the appropriate state licensing authorities; and
  • Requires the payment of reasonable and customary compensation to appraisers who are not employees of the creditors or of the appraisal management companies hired by the creditors.

Compliance is optional until April 1, 2011, at which time compliance will become mandatory.

 

Public comments are due 60 days after the interim final rule is published in the Federal Register, which is expected shortly.

 

Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher

Kahrl Wutscher LLP

The Loop Center Building

105 W. Madison Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois  60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320 

Fax:  (866) 581-9302
Mobile:  (312) 493-0874

RWutscher@kw-llp.com

http://www.kw-llp.com

 

NOTICE:  We do not send unsolicited emails.  If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention.  Thank you.

 

Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.kw-llp.com