Friday, January 19, 2018

FYI: 7th Cir Holds Debt Collector Violated FDCPA Despite Using Miller Safe Harbor Language

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that "debt collectors cannot immunize themselves from FDCPA liability by blindly copying and pasting the Miller safe harbor language" where that language is inaccurate under the circumstances.

 

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court decision granting the debt collector's motion to dismiss.  

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The plaintiff debtors ("Debtors") were Wisconsin residents who incurred and defaulted on debts for medical services.  Their creditors sold those debts to the defendant collection agency ("Agency"), which in turn sent the Debtors a letter with the following statement:

 

"As of the date of this letter, you owe $[a stated amount].  Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.  Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your check.  For further information, write to the above address or call [phone number]."

 

The Debtors filed a complaint alleging the letter was false because under Wisconsin law, the Agency could not lawfully or contractually impose "late charges and other charges."  The Debtors further alleged that the letter "causes unsophisticated consumers to incorrectly believe that they will avoid such charges, and thus benefit financially, if they immediately send payment."  The Debtors claimed the letter was therefore false, misleading, and deceptive in violation of section 1692e of the FDCPA.

 

The Agency filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it complied with the FDCPA as a matter of law because the allegedly false statement tracked the safe harbor language provided by the Seventh Circuit in Miller v. McCalla, Raymar, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, LLC, 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000).  The Agency further argued that although it was not lawfully entitled to impose "late charges and other charges," reference to such charges was not materially misleading because it was entitled to charge interest.

 

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Debtors appealed.

 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first analyzed whether the letter was "materially false, misleading, and deceptive" in violation of section 1692e.  In determining that it was, the court first looked to the language of the letter, which provided: "[b]ecause of interest, late charges and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater." 

 

Although it did charge interest, the Agency admitted that it could not impose "late charges or other charges" under Wisconsin law.  "Therefore, the dunning letter falsely implies a possible outcome – the imposition of 'late charges and other charges' – that cannot legally come to pass."  Thus, the statement was "misleading to an unsophisticated consumer because '[t]his is not the type of legal knowledge we can presume the general public has at its disposal.'"

 

The Court next analyzed the issue of whether the challenged statement was material – i.e., whether it "would influence an unsophisticated consumer's decision to pay the debt."  The Agency argued that it was not, because the debt was variable, and "[a]ny consumer who owes a variable debt must decide whether to pay sooner than later to avoid that variance, regardless of whether any increase in the amount of the debt is due to the addition of interest, late charges, other charges, or some combination thereof." 

 

The Seventh Circuit disagreed, ruling that "an unsophisticated consumer understands that these additional charges could further increase the amount of debt owed, thus potentially making it 'more costly' for the consumer to hold off on payment."  Thus, "it is plausible that the fear of 'late charges and other charges' might influence these consumers' choices," and therefore the statement is material. 

 

Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Miller safe harbor applied.  In deciding the issue, the court first discussed the Miller opinion, which dealt with a violation of section 1692g(a)(1) of the FDCPA, which requires debt collectors to send consumers written notice containing "the amount of the debt."  The Miller court determined that debt collectors are not excused from the requirements of section 1692g(a)(1) simply because the amount of the debt might change daily, but "in an effort to minimize litigation," the court fashioned "safe harbor" language for debt collectors to use if the amount is variable.

 

The Miller court ruled that although debt collectors are not required to use the language, "[a] debt collector who uses this form will not violate the 'amount of debt' provision, provided, of course, that the information he furnishes is accurate and he does not obscure it by adding confusing other information (or misinformation)." 

 

However, as the Miller case only dealt with section 1692g(a)(1), there was initially a question of whether it even applied to section 1692e.  The Seventh Circuit agreed with numerous district court decisions, and determined that the safe harbor language does apply to section 1692e.

 

Still, the Court then noted that "even if a debt collector may generally rely on the safe harbor language to avoid liability under § 1692e, Miller's accuracy requirement still applies." 

 

In this instance, the Agency's "use of the safe harbor language was inaccurate because [the Agency] could not lawfully impose 'late charges and other charges.'"  Thus, the Agency was not entitled to safe harbor protection under Miller.

 

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that "debt collectors cannot immunize themselves from FDCPA liability by blindly copying and pasting the Miller safe harbor language without regard for whether that language is accurate under the circumstances."  The Court therefore reversed the decision of the trial court.

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

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Wednesday, January 17, 2018

FYI: Ill App Ct (1st Dist) Holds Subsequent Foreclosure-Related Action Barred by Illinois "Single Refiling" Rule

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee's "breach of mortgage contract" action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

 

In so ruling, the Appellate Court concluded that, despite the plaintiff mortgagee's differing theories of relief based upon foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment and enforcement of the note itself in past suits, dismissal was warranted under Illinois law, because all of the complaints arose from a single group of operative facts and sought to obtain amounts owed by the borrowers under the terms of the note due to default.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

After two borrowers failed to make payments on their mortgage, a mortgagee's predecessor in interest filed a foreclosure complaint in 2011 ("2011 foreclosure complaint"), and then voluntarily dismissed the action in 2013. A few weeks later, the current mortgagee ("mortgagee") filed a complaint for breach of promissory note ("2013 breach of promissory note action"), which it subsequently voluntarily dismissed in 2015.

 

Approximately four months after that dismissal, the mortgagee filed the underlying two-count complaint for breach of contract and in the alternative, unjust enrichment ("2015 breach of contract complaint") alleging default under the terms of the promissory note.

 

The borrowers moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was barred by section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that that if a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a cause of action, "the plaintiff … may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, … after the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff." 735 ILCS 5/13-217.  However, the rule also permits only one refiling of a claim following a voluntary dismissal.

 

The trial court denied the borrowers' motion to dismiss, concluding that although the foreclosure complaint and breach of mortgage contract action were "closely related," they were not "part of the same transaction or occurrence."  Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the instant 2015 breach of contract complaint did not constitute a second refiling of the 2011 foreclosure complaint, but a "first refiling of [mortgagee's] 2013 breach of promissory note action under 13-217." 

 

After the borrowers' motion to reconsider was denied, the borrowers answered the complaint and asserted affirmative defense, including: (i) that the breach of contract complaint was an improper second refiling of a voluntarily dismissed complaint, and; (ii) that the note attached to the breach of contract complaint was "no note at all, but rather a compilation of two unsigned pages of the Note and a third signature page from a rider to the Mortgage."

 

The Mortgagee moved to strike the affirmative defenses and for summary judgment, which was granted.  In entering summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee and against borrowers, the trial court rejected the borrowers' affirmative defenses and found that the mortgagee had established all necessary elements for its breach of contract claim.  Judgment was entered against the defendant borrowers in the amount of $308,192.56.  The instant appeal followed.

 

The Appellate Court first examined the borrowers' argument that its motion to dismiss was improperly denied because the complaint was an improper second refiling of the 2011 foreclosure complaint.

 

As you may recall, in River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 307 (1998), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a "transactional" test to determine whether separate complaints involved the same cause of action, which holds that claims can "be considered part of the same cause of action even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence, so long as they arise from the same transaction," and that separate claims are "considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief." Id. at 311.

The Appellate Court found its previous ruling in LSREF2 Nova Investments III, LLC v. Coleman, 2015 IL App (1st) 140184 instructive in its application of the transactional test in the instant appeal. 

 

In Coleman, the predecessor in interest to the mortgagee plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure and personal judgment for deficiency.  The trial court entered judgment of foreclosure and an in rem deficiency judgment against the borrower.  Approximately one year later, the plaintiff mortgagee filed a complaint seeking to enforce the promissory note against the borrower.  The trial court granted the borrower's motion to dismiss based upon res judicata, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, finding that "[i]n the foreclosure action, plaintiff sought to foreclose on defendant's property, but also explicitly sought a personal deficiency judgment against defendant. Plaintiff sought the personal deficiency judgment based on defendant's obligations under both the promissory note and the mortgage" pursuant to section 15-1508(e) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(e) (West 2016)). Coleman, 2015 IL App (1st) 140184, ¶ 14.

 

Here, as in Coleman, the Appellate Court held that the single-count complaint, requesting foreclosure of the mortgage as well as a personal judgment for any deficiency, involves operative facts arising from both the mortgage and the promissory note.  Thus, for purposes of res judicata, the Court held that the same set of operative facts gave rise to the causes of action in the 2011 foreclosure complaint and the 2013 breach of note complaint. 

 

Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the mortgagee's breach of contract action represented an improper second refiling in violation of section 13-217, and the trial court erred in failing to grant the borrowers' motion to dismiss the breach of contract count.

 

The complaint, however, also alleged a count, in the alternative, for unjust enrichment.  Although the trial court made no explicit findings regarding this count, its order granting summary judgment "dispose[d] of the case in its entirety."  Thus, the mortgagee argued on appeal that the trial court's grant of summary judgment based upon unjust enrichment could be affirmed.

 

However, the Appellate Court disagreed, citing past precedent holding that the theory of unjust enrichment is inapplicable where an express contract — such as a note and mortgage — governs' the parties' relationship.  Karen Stavins Enterprises, Inc. v. Community College District No. 508, County of Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 150356, ¶ 7; Gagnon v. Schickel, 2012 IL App (1st) 120645, ¶ 25.

 

Accordingly, the Appellate Court vacated and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee, and dismissed the mortgagee's complaint.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC   |   Wisconsin

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

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and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments