Thursday, December 24, 2015

FYI: MD Fla Bankr Holds TPCA Revocation of Consent Must Be "Express and Clear"

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida recently held that:

 

1)  A bankruptcy trustee was entitled to recover $1,000 in statutory damages on behalf of each of the husband and wife debtors against a loan servicer for violating the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA") by contacting the debtors after they were represented by counsel; and

 

2)  The servicer could not set off the $2,000 in FCCPA damages against the balance owed on the mortgage loan because, according to the Court, allowing a set off would thwart the FCCPA's goal of deterring abusive debt collection practices; and

 

3) The servicer did not violate the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") because the debtors did not "expressly and clearly" revoke their prior consent to be called using the cell phone number they provided on their loan application.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

Husband and wife obtained a loan secured by a mortgage on their home in 2007. In 2010, the wife's health deteriorated and by the end of the year, they defaulted.

 

The debtors hired an attorney in February of 2011. The following month, the servicer began trying to collect the balance owed on the mortgage. These efforts included calling the debtors. On one of the calls, the husband allegedly provided the name and contact information of their attorney.  After this call, the servicer allegedly continued making phone calls and sending letters to the debtors.

 

In July of 2011, the debtors filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy. The chapter 7 trustee then filed an adversary complaint against the servicer seeking statutory damages under the FCCPA and the TCPA.

 

The servicer denied the allegations of the complaint and argued that it was entitled to set off any damages against the balance owed on the mortgage. The case eventually went to trial in May of 2014.

 

The Court began by addressing the TCPA claim, explaining that the TCPA prohibits placing autodialed calls to cell phones without the "prior express consent of the called party."  The parties stipulated at trial that the servicer made 11 auto-dialed calls to the husband's cell phone number.

 

However, because the debtors had given the husband's cell phone number on the loan application and never revoked the authorization to call that number, the Court found that  this constituted "prior express consent."

 

The husband argued that he later revoked his consent, but the Court held that Eleventh Circuit precedent requires "express and clear revocation of consent; implicit revocation will not do."  At best, the Court found, the debtors "implicitly revoked their consent" because when asked on cross examination whether he clearly told the servicer to stop calling his cell phone, the husband admitted he did not.

 

The Court then turned to the FCCPA claim, explaining that "[a]ny person who violates the FCCPA is liable for actual damages, statutory damages not to exceed $1,000, court costs, and the plaintiff' reasonable attorney's fees."

 

The Court found that the debtors did not prove any actual damages, but were entitled to recover $1,000 each in statutory damages, rejecting the servicer's argument that the wife could not recover damages because it only communicated with the husband.

 

The Court reasoned that, although most of the contact was with the husband, there was unrebutted testimony that the wife saw collection notices addressed to her, which the Court held was enough to violate the FCCPA, especially when the evidence indicated that the servicer knew that the debtors had an attorney at the time.  In addition, the Court held that the FCCPA prohibits "indirect communication with a represented debtor," which the servicer did when it communicated with the husband about the debtors' joint debt.

 

The Court then found that the servicer was not entitled to set off the $2,000 statutory damages against the balance owed on the mortgage because, although the law generally favors set offs, "the decision to permit or disallow a setoff as to FCCPA liability is within the bankruptcy court's discretion, and a setoff in this case is unfitting."

 

The Court reasoned that "[i]n addition to eradicating abusive practices, the FCCPA aims to protect each consumer's right to privacy. If these goals are to be reached, consumer collection agencies must appreciate the real penalties for violating the FCCPA. Otherwise, the FCCPA will have little to no deterrent effect. If a consumer collection agency knows that it can engage in harassing and obnoxious debt collection practices with the best outcome being that it squeezes money from consumers and the worst being that the consumer's debt is merely reduced by penalties imposed under the FCCPA—with no money ever coming out of the collection agency's pocket—the collection agency will have no reason to play by the rules."

 

The Court concluded that the trustee was entitled to recover $2,000 in statutory damages under the FCCPA, which could not be set off against the servicer's proof of claim filed in the main bankruptcy case.

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

California   |   Florida   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services

 

 

 

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

FYI: WD Mo Holds Account Number on Envelope Did Not Violate FDCPA

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri recently held that an internal account number displayed on the envelope of a debt collector's demand letter did not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") because it did not reveal that plaintiff consumer was a debtor.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion  

In March 2014, a debt collector sent a demand letter regarding a consumer debt owed by the plaintiff consumer (Plaintiff).  The letter's envelope had a window in which Plaintiff's name, address and account number were visible.  The debt collector maintained the account number was not a number provided by Plaintiff, but was instead assigned by the debt collector and known only internally within the debt collector's business.

Plaintiff filed suit in March 2015, alleging the demand letter violated the FDCPA because it included her personally identifiable information (i.e., the account number) on the exterior of the envelope and visible to third parties.  The debt collector filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Court granted.

As you may recall, it is a violation of the FDCPA to use "any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business."  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). 

Here, Plaintiff's account number was visible on the exterior of the envelope used by the debt collector.  However, as the Court noted, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that adhering to the plain language of this provision of the FDCPA would "create bizarre results"  -- for example, the plain language of the statute would prevent the debtor's address, postage, or other postal marks such as "overnight mail" from being placed on the outside of an envelope.  Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit in Strand concluded that the FDCPA "does not proscribe benign language and symbols" from being visible on the outside of an envelope.  Id. at 319. 

The Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's differing ruling in Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014). According to the Court, in Douglass, the Third Circuit held that an internal account number and QR code printed on the outside of an envelope violated the FDCPA.  765 F.3d at 302.

Of note, however, the Third Circuit's ruling in Douglass was not a QR code case.  In fact, the Douglass opinion expressly states in fn 4:  "Douglass no longer presses her argument that [the defendant in that case] violated the FDCPA by including the QR Code on the envelope.  Appellant Br. 5 n. 2.  We therefore do not decide that issue."

The Western District of Missouri went on to say that the Third Circuit in Douglass determined that the inclusion of the number and QR Code on the exterior of the envelope was not benign because "it [wa]s a piece of information capable of identifying [the plaintiff] as a debtor. And its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address." Id. at 306.  The Court noted that the Third Circuit distinguished the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Strand because Strand "did not confront an envelope that displayed core information relating to the debt collection and susceptible to privacy intrusions." Id. at 305

The Court here, being within the Eighth Circuit, in turn distinguished the Third Circuit's ruling in Douglass, noting that the envelope at issue in Douglass contained an account number and a visible QR code, which, when scanned by a smart phone or similar device, revealed various personal information about the plaintiff, including the monetary amount corresponding to the Douglass plaintiff's alleged debt, but that in this case the Plaintiff did not allege that someone viewing the envelope at issue here could use the string of numbers in the visible account number to obtain information about the amount of his debt or other private information.

Plaintiff argued the display of the account number was not benign because it violated his privacy rights by exposing his account number to third parties.  The Court disagreed, reasoning that the legislative purpose of the FCPA was to prohibit a debt collector from using symbols and language on envelopes that would reveal that the contents pertained to debt collection.  Although the Court noted that a debtor's privacy is a legitimate concern, the Court believed the purpose of the FDCPA was not to prevent disclosure of internal account numbers, but to prevent identification of the recipient as a debtor.

Accordingly, the Court held that benign information which does not reveal that the recipient is a debtor may be included on the exterior of an envelope.  Because the account number contained on the envelope to the Plaintiff did not reveal she was a debtor, the Court held it did not violate the FDCPA.




Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751
Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

Admitted to practice law in Illinois



California   |   Florida   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC


NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.

Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:


and


and


and


and



Monday, December 21, 2015

FYI: 1st Cir Holds "Fairly Conducted" Sale of Collateral Not Necessarily "Commercially Reasonable"

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that a genuine dispute of material fact precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether the sale of collateral was "commercially reasonable," even though there was no evidence that the sale was not "fairly conducted."

 

A copy of the opinion is available at: http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1157P-01A.pdf

 

The assignee of a loan secured by an interest in an aircraft sued the guarantor of the loan to collect $108,681.50, the deficiency that remained after the assignee sold the collateral through a third-party dealer.

 

Pursuant to the loan documents, the assignee repossessed the plane and moved it to Florida into the custody of the third-party dealer. While in the third-party dealer's custody, the plane was vandalized and avionics components stolen.

 

Approximately two months later, the assignee sold the plane in "as-is" condition for $155,000. The sales agreement, however, required the seller to replace the missing components.

 

After deducting the cost of replacing the missing equipment and additional repairs, the assignee demanded payment of $108,681.50 from the guarantor and sued in New Hampshire federal district court to collect this deficiency based on diversity jurisdiction.

 

The assignee moved for summary judgment early in the action, which motion was denied without prejudice. After discovery, the assignee filed a second motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that the guarantor had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sale was "commercial reasonable" because, the district court held, selling repossessed collateral through a dealer, if such sale is "fairly conducted," is recognized as commercially reasonable.  The guarantor appealed.

 

On appeal, the First Circuit explained that the district court, based on its finding of commercial reasonableness, apparently determined that the assignee had met its initial burden and therefore shifted the burden of proof to the guarantor to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

 

The Court noted that the applicable Nevada law, which governed under the loan documents, placed the burden on the creditor to prove that the sale of the collateral was commercially reasonable. Reasoning that the party bearing the burden of proof at trial also bears the burden of proof at the summary judgment stage, in this case to show that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than that the sale was "commercially reasonable,"  the First Circuit found that the district court prematurely shifted the burden of proof to the guarantor.

 

The Court rejected as misplaced the assignee's reliance on a Nevada Supreme Court case, Jones v. Bank of Nevada, because that opinion did not hold that using a dealer alone qualifies a sale as "commercially reasonable" regardless of whether the sale was "fairly conducted."  Instead, the First Circuit noted, the Jones ruling states the opposite: use of a dealer must also be "fairly conducted."

 

The First Circuit reasoned that the assignee must show, under the facts at issue here where the repossessed collateral was vandalized while in the dealer's care such that the plane could not be flown, that the dealer's disposition of the collateral was in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.

,

The Court rejected the assignee's argument that the guarantor's consent to using the dealer in question and communications leading up to the sale made the sale commercially reasonable, because the assignee cited no Nevada authorities in support of its interpretation of Nevada law.

 

Instead, the First Circuit found persuasive the guarantor's argument that the missing avionics would likely have turned way buyers, concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could decide against the assignee.  It also agreed with the guarantor that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dealer's handling of the sale after the vandalism fell below the standard of reasonable commercial practices among such dealers.

 

The Court's conclusion was not altered by damage that already existed at the time or repossession. Simply put, the Court held, a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that an airworthy plane would attract more interest and a higher price than would a non-airworthy plane that had been vandalized, even if the seller promised to repair the known damage. The Court noted that, with a non-airworthy plane that had been vandalized, the buyer may wonder what else happened to the plane and has no chance to test it out.

 

Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that, because the assignee failed to show that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than that the sale was "commercially reasonable," summary judgment should have been denied.  It reversed and remanded the case.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

California   |   Florida   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services

 

 

 

 

Sunday, December 20, 2015

FYI: 11th Cir Holds Florida Statute Prohibiting Fees to Pay By Credit Card Unconstitutional

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently struck down Florida's "anti-surcharge" statute, Fla. Stat. § 501.0117, holding that the Florida law prohibiting charging a fee to pay by credit card was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201414426.pdf

Four small businesses filed suit after receiving cease-and-desist letters from the Florida Attorney General demanding they refrain from charging lower prices for customers using cash and higher prices for those using credit cards, and demanding that they refrain from telling their customers the price difference is an additional amount for credit-card users rather than a lesser amount for paying in cash. 

According to the Florida Attorney General, this practice ran afoul of the Florida's "anti-surcharge" law in Fla. Stat. §  501.0117 (the "Anti-Surcharge Statute"), which provided, in relevant part:

A seller or lessor in a sales or lease transaction may not impose a surcharge on the buyer or lessee for electing to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means, if the seller or lessor accepts payment by credit card. A surcharge is any additional amount imposed at the time of a sale or lease transaction by the seller or lessor that increases the charge to the buyer or lessee for the privilege of using a credit card to make payment . . . This section does not apply to the offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective customers.

See Fla. Stat. § 501.0117(1).

The businesses asserted that Anti-Surcharge Statute violated the First Amendment as an unjustified restriction on speech, and that the Anti-Surcharge Statute provided insufficient guidance on how to comply with its mandates and was therefore void for vagueness. 

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Florida's Attorney General, holding that the Anti-Surcharge Statute was a restriction on pricing that fell within the Florida Legislature's broad discretion in regulating economic affairs, and therefore subjected the law to rational-basis review. 

In so ruling, the District Court hypothesized three possible justifications.  First, the law was aimed at preventing "bait and switch" tactics, i.e., initially communicating only the lower, cash price, and then later charging a higher price, the credit card price.  Second, the law prevented "unpleasant surprises" in the marketplace.  Third, the law prevented "competitive disadvantage" in the marketplace by preventing merchants from imposing credit card surcharges at their discretion.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that Florida's Anti-Surcharge Statute violated the First Amended to the United States Constitution as an unlawful restriction on free speech.

The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by analyzing whether Florida's Anti-Surcharge Statute regulated speech, which triggered First Amendment scrutiny, or whether it only regulated other non-speech conduct, which would be subject only to rational basis review as economic regulation.  

Looking to the plain language of the statute, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Anti-Surcharge Statute expressly allowed businesses to offer a "discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash."  Fla. Stat. §  501.0117(1).  According to the Eleventh Circuit, by allowing businesses to offer discounts for cash payments, the statute did not ban dual-pricing. 

 

Instead, the Court held, the statute banned the selective raising of previously announced prices "imposed at the time of sale" for credit card users.  Fla. Stat. §  501.0117(1).  Under this reading of the Anti-Surcharge Statute, a business could charge customers different rates based on their method of payment, but could charge a higher price to credit card users if that price is announced before the transaction occurs.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this construction because it would nullify the goal of preventing bait-and-switch tactics.  The Court noted that all a business would have to do to avoid liability is to announce to potential customers the price difference in advance of any sale through notice posted on signs, on price tags, as a line item on receipts, and the like. 

 

Moreover, the Court noted that consumers may already be protected against "bait-and-switch" practices by Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the state's unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) law.  See Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201-501.213.  Without finding any textual or contextual indication that the Florida Legislature intended the Anti-Surcharge Statute to function solely as a backstop to its UDAP law, the Eleventh Circuit declined to read the law contrary to its plain meaning.

Instead, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Anti-Surcharge Statute must have meant that businesses can engage in dual-pricing so long as they offer only cash discounts, while credit-card surcharges are prohibited.  Therefore, the Court held, the statute targeted expression alone.  To violate the statute, a defendant must communicate the price difference to a customer and that communication must denote the relevant price difference as a credit card surcharge. 

 

The Court provided the following example:

Ostensibly worried about customers' dining experiences being adversely affected by their unquenched thirst, a state makes it a crime for restaurateurs to serve half-empty beverages.  Restaurateurs are, however, expressly allowed to serve half-full beverages. 

Liability for violating this glass-half-full mandate turned solely on the restaurateurs' choice of words.  Absent any communication from the restaurateurs, there would be no real world difference between the two formulations.  Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, calling § 501.0117 an Anti-Surcharge Statute is something of a misnomer because statute targets expression, dictating what the restaurateurs can talk about and how restaurateurs can speak about those subjects.

Because the Anti-Surcharge Statute was a restriction on speech, and not conduct, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the statute triggered First Amendment scrutiny.   

As you may recall, content based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.  See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).  However, content based restrictions on certain categories of speech such as commercial and professional speech have more leeway under the First Amendment because of the greater need for regulatory flexibility in those areas.  See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  For these categories of speech, the inquiry is the more flexible standard of intermediate scrutiny.  See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (1980). 

Noting that Florida's Anti-Surcharge Statute skirted the line between targeting commercial speech and restricting speech at large, the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by determining whether the statute was subject to strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.

On one hand, the Eleventh Circuit noted, the statute clearly touched on economic activity.  The law on its face appeared to regulate businesses engaged in dual pricing.  On the other, the Court noted, the law purged the term surcharge and replaced it with the state's preferred term, discount.  In so doing, the Court held, the law regulated more than commercial speech, it imposed a direct and substantial burden on disfavored speech by silencing it.   Thus, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Anti-Surcharge Statute was a content based restriction regulating only how a business may frame the price difference between cash and credit card payments.

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Anti-Surcharge Statute is also viewpoint based because it denied one's equally accurate account of reality in favor of the state's preferred term of expression.  Viewpoint based restrictions warranted the greatest level of First Amendment protection due to the obvious threat to freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. 

Ultimately, however, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed Florida's Anti-Surcharge Statute as if it were commercial speech because it failed even under the more forgiving standard of intermediate scrutiny.  Therefore, the Court noted, the law would also fail if it were subject to the heightened strict scrutiny.

As you may recall, the constitutionality of regulations on commercial speech is assessed under the four part Central Hudson test.  First, does the challenged law regulate speech that is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity?  Second, does the government have a substantial interest at stake?  Third, does the law directly advance the government's interest?  Fourth, would a more limited restriction be insufficient for that interest to be served as well?  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 100 S. Ct. at 2350.

The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's Anti-Surcharge Statute foundered at every step of this inquiry. 

To start, calling the additional fee paid by a credit card user a surcharge rather than a discount is, according to the Eleventh Circuit, no more misleading than is calling the temperature warmer in Savannah rather than colder in Escanaba.  Thus, the Court held the Anti-Surcharge Statute did not target only false or misleading speech.  Instead, the Court held the law targeted speech, and not conduct, because businesses may engage in dual pricing as long as they disclosed the surcharge in a specific manner.

Next, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a generalized interest in "consumer protection" was too abstract to provide a meaningful benchmark for weighing the Anti-Surcharge Statute against the state's purported interest.  In fact, the Court noted that Florida's proffered interest in protecting consumers was undermined by the fact that the state exempted certain state agencies from the Anti-Surcharge Statute -- allowing them to charge "convenience fees" for the privilege of using a credit card, Fla. Stat.  § 215.322(2), (3)(b) -- without advancing any relevant distinction between private businesses and state agencies that referenced the interests being served.

Considering the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs together, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Anti-Surcharge Statute neither advanced any substantial state interest nor was it narrowly tailored. 

The Eleventh Circuit explained that any governmental interest in preventing "bait-and-switch" tactics and leveling the playing field among businesses would be better served by direct and focused regulation on actual pricing behavior.  Florida could simply prohibit dual pricing altogether, or cap the difference in price that can be charged to customers paying with cash and those using credit cards, just as it had done for the use of credit cards at state agencies and for the use of a "money transmitter service."  See Fla. Stat. §§ 215.322(3)(b), 560.208(2).  Or, the Court noted, it could ban false and deceptive trade practices as it generally did for acts of unfair competition under the state's Unfair Trade Practice Act, Fla. Stat. §§  501.201-501.213. 

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that less restrictive alternatives were available and therefore the Anti-Surcharge Statute failed survive intermediate scrutiny.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of the Florida Attorney General and remanded for further proceeding consistent with its opinion.

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

California   |   Florida   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services