Thursday, September 22, 2016

FYI: 6th Cir Reverses Dismissal of Data Breach Consolidated Class Actions

In an unpublished ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of consolidated class actions arising from a data breach, holding that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue certain tort claims and that the district court had erred in dismissing a federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The plaintiffs brought class actions against an insurance company alleging violations of the FCRA and common law tort claims for invasion of privacy, negligence and bailment after hackers breached the insurer's computer network.  Finding a lack of Article III standing related to the negligence and bailment claims, a lack of statutory standing pursuant to the FCRA, and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy, the district court dismissed the action. The plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their negligence, bailment and FCRA claims on appeal.

 

The consolidated class actions arose after hackers broke into Nationwide's computer network and stole the personal information of the putative class members including names, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers, Social Security numbers and driver's license numbers. As a result, Nationwide contacted the class to inform of the breach, offered a year of free credit monitoring and identity fraud protection and suggested that the class set up a fraud alert and place a security freeze on their credit reports, although not offering to pay for these services which, pursuant to the Nationwide website, could cost between $5 and $20 and could affect the ability to obtain credit.

 

Pursuant to the Supreme Court of the United States' holding in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), for Article III standing, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of a defendant, and (3) that such injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

 

The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts reflective of an imminent injury to satisfy the first prong of standing. The Court noted that where a plaintiff seeks to establish standing based upon an "imminent injury", the threatened injury must be "certainly impending" to constitute injury in fact, and allegations of possible future injury are insufficient. The Court found that the plaintiffs' allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, relating to the data breach satisfied the injury prong of Article III standing.

 

The Court noted that where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use such data for fraudulent purposes, as alleged in the complaints at issue, such that there is a substantial risk of harm.

 

In addition, the Sixth Circuit held that although it might not be "literally certain" that the hacked data would be misused to the plaintiffs' detriment, the plaintiffs allegedly incurred costs of time and money to monitor and manage their credit and other financials reflected reasonably incurred mitigation costs. The Court noted in this regard that although the insurer offered to provide some credit monitoring services for free, the offer was only for a limited time and did not include covering the costs of certain precautions, such as credit freezes, which the insurer recommended the putative class take in the wake of the data breach. The Court noted that such costs were reflective of "concrete injury" suffered to mitigate an "imminent harm".

 

The Sixth Circuit next held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the second prong by alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that the injury was "fairly traceable" to the conduct of the insurer where the complaints alleged that the insurer failed to have in place sufficient safeguards to protect the security and confidentiality of the plaintiffs' data.

 

Noting that the traceability requirement serves to eliminate those cases in which a third party and not the named defendant caused the injury, the Court opined that, in interpreting the allegations of the complaints, "but for [the insurer's] allegedly lax security, the hackers would not have been able to steal Plaintiffs' data."

 

The Sixth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs had also demonstrated that their injury would likely be redressed by a ruling in their favor, sufficient to satisfy the third prong of Article III standing, as the plaintiffs' complaints sought compensatory damages for their injuries.

 

The Court then reversed the district court's dismissal of the FCRA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Noting that the district court concluded that the complaints alleged violations of the FCRA's statement of purpose, rather than violations of any substantive provision of the statute, the Court concluded that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was error. Instead, the Sixth Circuit held, if the plaintiffs failed to plead statutory standing pursuant to the FCRA, the appropriate resolution was to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim for relief.

         

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Maryland   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services

 

 

Wednesday, September 21, 2016

FYI: ND Cal Holds Numerous Unwanted Calls Required for TCPA Standing

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California recently held that an individual had Article III standing to bring a federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") claim against a bank because the individual sufficiently alleged a concrete and particularized injury.

 

However, the Court warned that not just any alleged violation of the TCPA will necessarily give rise to Article III standing.  The Court found persuasive the allegations here that the bank supposedly made voluminous calls to the individual even after the individual supposedly requested the bank to stop calling him because he was not the debtor. 

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The plaintiff alleged that during a twelve day period the defendant bank called him at least 42 times on his cellular phone using an autodialer and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice in an attempt to collect a consumer debt.  He alleged that he received at least 3 calls a day during this time period and provided a chart detailing the date and time of the calls.

 

Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that he did not give the bank prior written consent to make these calls and repeatedly requested that the bank stop calling, informing the bank that he was not the individual it was attempting to contact.  Prior to receiving these calls, he allegedly never had any contact with the bank and did not provide them with his phone number.

 

The individual filed a putative class action under the TCPA and the Rosenthal Act, a California statute paralleling the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  The bank moved to dismiss and to strike the complaint arguing that the individual failed to allege standing, failed to state a claim, and used improper fail safe class definitions.

 

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California first addressed the issue of Article III standing under the recent Supreme Court of the United States ruling Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 

 

As you may recall, to establish standing under Spokeo, a plaintiff bringing a statutory violation must still allege a concrete and particularized injury.  The bank argued that the plaintiff merely alleged a procedural violation without concrete harm or injury, while the individual argued that the phone calls were harm in the form of involuntary telephone and electrical charges, aggravation, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. 

 

The Court noted that district courts have not reached a consensus on whether a plaintiff's allegations that she received annoying and unwanted phone calls in violation of the TCPA is sufficient to establish Article III standing since Spokeo was decided.  Some courts found that allegations of an autodialing system to call thousands of phone numbers to promote its products was in it of itself a concrete injury under the TCPA because the allegations required plaintiffs to waste time answering or otherwise addressing the calls, and because the calls made the phones unavailable for other calls. 

 

In contrast, the Court here noted, other courts have found that a plaintiff who alleged voluminous  phone calls from a debt collector could not establish standing under the TCPA because she could not show that any individual phone call had caused sufficient lost time, aggravation, and distress to constitute a concrete injury.

 

After weighing these contradictory opinions, the Court held that the present individual had pled sufficient facts to show that the unwanted calls he received were an annoyance that caused him to waste time. 

 

However, the Court warned that any alleged violation of the TCPA will not necessarily give rise to Article III standing.  The Court cited calls made to a neglected phone that go unnoticed or calls that are dropped before they connect as an example of allegations that may violate the TCPA but not cause any concrete injury.

 

The plaintiff here alleged that he received at least 42 unwanted and unsolicited phone calls from the bank, getting multiple calls a day.  Furthermore, the plaintiff here alleged that he repeatedly requested that the bank stop calling, supposedly informing the bank that he was not the individual they were attempting to contact, but that the bank continued calling.  The Court found these allegations, if proven true, to show that the individual wasted his own time and energy dealing with the unwanted phone calls.

 

The Court explained that even a single phone call can cause lost time, annoyance, and frustration -- but especially so where the recipient receives repeated, regular phone calls from the same number and asks the caller to stop, but due to the call pattern, nevertheless worries about and anticipates additional calls.

 

Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff's allegations that he received numerous and repeated unwanted calls that caused him aggravation, nuisance, and an invasion of privacy, even after he supposedly asked that the calls be stopped, was sufficient to allege a concrete and particularized injury that establishes Article III standing under Spokeo.

 

Next, the Court addressed the individual's standing to sue under the Rosenthal Act.  The Rosenthal Act defines "debtor" as "a natural person from whom a debt collector seeks to collect a consumer debt that is due or owing or alleged to be due and owing from such person." Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2.  The bank argued that the plaintiff could not bring suit under the Rosenthal Act because only the actual debtor could bring a claim under the Rosenthal Act.

 

However, the Court disagreed.  The Court noted that the plaintiff alleged that he asked the bank to stop calling him and that he was not the individual they were attempting to contact.  However, the bank allegedly continued to contact the individual seeking to collect a debt.  Consequently, under these allegations, the Court determined that whether or not the individual was the debtor was in dispute and consequently the plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Rosenthal Act.

 

Relatedly, the Court analyzed whether the individual failed to state a claim under the Rosenthal Act.  The plaintiff brought his claim under sections 1788.11 (d) and (e) which prohibit a debt collector from causing a telephone to "ring repeatedly or continuously to annoy" and from communicating with a debtor with "such frequency as to be unreasonable and to constitute an harassment to the debtor under the circumstances." Cal. Code §§ 1788.11 (d) and (e).

 

The Court disagreed with the bank's argument that the individual failed to state a claim under the Rosenthal Act because he alleged only that he received a large number of calls and made no allegations regarding the content of any call.  To the contrary, the Court noted that the plaintiff not only alleged that there was a large volume of calls, but that the individual alleged a pattern of calls and alleged that he informed the bank to stop calling him because he was not the individual they were attempting to contact. 

 

The Court was satisfied that these allegations constituted harassing behavior under the Rosenthal Act.  Consequently, the individual's allegations stated a potential claim under this California statute. 

 

Last, the Court denied the bank's motion to strike the class definition because it was premature.  The Court reasoned that these issues are best addressed through a class certification motion after some discovery has been conducted. 

 

Thus, the Court denied both the bank's motion to dismiss and the motion to strike. 

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia  |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Maryland   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services

 

 

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

FYI: 6th Cir Holds Auto Dealer Not Excepted from Providing ECOA Adverse Action Notices

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that an automobile dealer is a "creditor" under the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") that was not excepted from the requirement to provide adverse action notices, as the dealer did not "merely arrange for credit by referring applicants to lenders" as provided under Regulation B.

 

The Court also reversed the district court's ruling that injunctive relief was not an available remedy under ECOA and also reversed summary judgment in dealer's favor on plaintiff's state-law conversion claim, remanding the case for further proceedings on those claims.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The plaintiff bought a used car for $8,525 from a car dealer in August of 2013. The plaintiff made a down payment of $1,248 and financed the balance.

 

As part of the financing transaction, the car dealer's salesman entered the plaintiff's employment and income information into a computer program provided by the non-party finance company. The data was wrongly entered, resulting in plaintiff's income more than doubling.

 

The retail installment contract for the purchase of the vehicle was then assigned to the finance company, which would fund the loan by paying the dealer an advance. If the financing agreement was not acceptable to the finance company, it "would not issue an advance and would only collect monthly payments."

 

Two days after the sale, the salesman called the plaintiff and asked her to return to the dealership. The dealer's employee told the plaintiff that because of the salesman's inputting error, she would have to pay an additional $1,500 as a down payment. Plaintiff refused and the dealer kept the car.

 

The dealership never gave the plaintiff any written notice explaining why the terms of her retail installment contract were changed.

 

Two days later, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. The complaint sought damages and injunctive relief because: a) the dealer failed to provide an adverse action notice required under ECOA; and b) defendants' actions constituted conversion under Michigan common and statutory law.

 

After the completion of discovery, the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted plaintiff's motion as to her ECOA claim, holding that the dealer was a "creditor" subject to ECOA's adverse action notice requirement, and the dealer admitted it never issued such notices.

 

The district court, however, denied plaintiff's claim for an injunction, holding that as a matter of law "equitable relief was not available to private parties under the ECOA." It also partially granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's claim for conversion because it was barred by Michigan's economic loss doctrine.

 

The parties resolved the remaining claims by stipulation and all sides appealed.

 

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit began by explaining that "the ECOA prohibits creditors from discouraging or discriminating against any credit applicant 'with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction … on the basis of color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.'"

 

The Court went on to explain that in 1976, the ECOA was amended "to include a provision requiring creditors to provide applicants with written notice of the specific reasons why an adverse action was taken in regards to their credit."

 

The Sixth Circuit then turned to the statutory text of 15 U.S.C § 1691(d)(2) and (3), which require a "creditor" to provide a written statement explaining the reasons why "adverse action" was taken against an applicant for credit either "as a matter of course" or by giving written notice of the right to a written explanation within 30 days after receiving a request. Subsection 1691(d)(6) defines "adverse action" as "a denial or revocation of credit, a change in terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested."

 

The parties did not dispute that plaintiff fit the definition of an applicant who suffered "adverse action" entitled to notice under § 1691(d) and that the dealer did not provide such notice. Instead, the parties' dispute centered on whether the dealer was a "creditor" required to give notice and whether the district court erred as a matter of law in deciding that injunctive relief was not available under the ECOA.

 

Parsing § 1691's definition of "creditor," the Court looked for guidance to Regulation B promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), which is the agency with authority to promulgate regulations implementing the ECOA.

 

The Sixth Circuit pointed out that under Regulation B, "those who merely arrange for credit by referring applicants to lenders are considered 'creditors' solely for the purposes of the ECOA's prohibitions on discrimination and discouragement. … Under Regulation B, in other words, 'creditors' who act as mere middle-men between applicants and lenders have no affirmative obligation to provide applicants with notice stating the reasons for any adverse action."

 

However, the Court agreed with the district court that the dealer was a "creditor" subject to the ECOA's notice requirement because it was a "person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal or continuation of credit" and fell within the statutory definition.

 

In addition, the dealer was a "creditor" because it "regularly participates in [the] credit decision' by 'setting the terms of the credit.'" This is because the dealer's witnesses testified that it structured the terms of the deal using the software provided by the finance company, including the price, interest and payments.

 

The Sixth Circuit rejected the dealer's argument that it was a mere "middle-man" because the finance company's "only role in the transaction was to determine whether it would pay [the dealer] an 'advance' on Plaintiff's financing agreement, the terms of which were set by [the dealer]." Because it was the dealer that decided to change the terms of financing when the finance company informed it no advance would be paid on plaintiff's deal, and in addition because the dealer regularly participated in credit decisions, this "triggered an obligation to provide Plaintiff with a written statement of its specific reasons for doing so."

 

The Court also rejected the dealer's remaining argument that it was not a creditor because it used the finance company's software and form contracts when preparing the financing agreement because "[t]he ECOA would be a paper tiger if creditors could insulate themselves from liability simply by using a third party's copyrighted forms or software when preparing a credit application."

 

The Sixth Circuit accordingly concluded that "the district court did not err by granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her claim under the ECOA."

 

Turning to the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, the Court concluded that because "the ECOA explicitly states that '[u]pon application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under [the Act] … the ECOA provides applicants for credit—i.e. private parties—with the right to seek equitable relief."

 

Because the district court denied injunctive relief based on a misinterpretation of controlling law, the Court concluded remand was necessary in order that the district court could determine whether an injunction was proper.

 

As to plaintiff's conversion claim, the Court concluded that "the district court erred in applying the economic loss doctrine to bar her statutory conversion claims" because the economic loss doctrine did not apply to facts of the case at bar.

 

Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that, because title to the automobile transferred from the dealer to the finance company upon execution of the retail installment contract before the plaintiff returned the car to the dealer, "it cannot be said that her conversion claims are based on Defendants' violation of a duty arising under the contract of sale." Instead, at that point in time, the dealer's "duty to refrain from wrongfully exerting dominion over Plaintiff's vehicle emanated from the policies underlying the tort of conversion."

 

Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the district court erred by granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for statutory conversion."

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Maryland   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services

 

 

 

 

Monday, September 19, 2016

FYI: 2nd Cir Denies Arbitration Due to Specific Agreement as to Arbitration Forum That Was No Longer Available

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently confirm that, in the Second Circuit, an arbitration agreement is no longer binding where the intent of the parties was to arbitrate with only a specific arbitrator and that arbitrator is unavailable.

 

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion

 

The borrower took out payday loans from an online payday lender.  The payday lender relied on banks to serve as middlemen to debit the customer's account.  Two banks each debited the borrower's account for one payday loan.

 

When the borrower applied for the loans, she signed an application that included an arbitration clause.  The arbitration clause stated that any and all claims, disputes or controversies between the borrower and payday lender shall be resolved under the code of procedure section of a specifically-named arbitration forum. 

 

The clause then identified the named arbitration forum's address, website, and telephone number.  Additionally, the clause stated that the named arbitration forum would waive its fees if a borrower could not afford them.  The other applications the borrower signed contained similar arbitration clauses.

 

The borrower filed a putative federal class action against the two banks in federal court, alleging violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and state law.  In short, the borrower alleged that the banks unlawfully facilitated high-interest payday loans that have been outlawed in several states.

 

The banks moved to compel arbitration on the basis of the arbitration agreements even though they were not parties to those agreements.  The banks argued that they were entitled to enforce the agreements against the plaintiff under principles of estoppel.  The district court agreed and initially granted the banks' motion to compel arbitration and stayed the proceedings.  

 

Subsequently, the borrower sent a letter to the named arbitration forum indicating her intent to arbitrate her claims.  The named arbitration forum declined to arbitrate the claims as a result of a consent judgment with a state's attorney general not to arbitrate such claims.  

 

The borrower returned to federal court and moved to vacate the district court's order compelling arbitration.  The district court concluded that the language of the arbitration agreements reflected the parties' intent to arbitrate exclusively before the named arbitration forum and vacated its prior order and lifted its stay of the proceeding.  The banks appealed.

 

On appeal, the Second Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act to review an order refusing a stay of any action.   The Court determined that the district court's order appealed from was effectively one refusing a stay. 

 

The Court then explained that the language of the Federal Arbitration Act reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.  Consistent with that text, courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.  Consequently, the Court continued, as with any contract, the intent of the parties controls and such intent is determined by looking at the language of the agreement. 

 

In analyzing the present arbitration clause, the Second Circuit highlighted the agreement's language that disputes shall be resolved under the code of procedure of the named arbitration forum.  Additionally, the Court noted that the agreement does not address how the parties should proceed in the event that the named arbitration forum is unable to accept the dispute.

 

In arriving in its decision, the Second Circuit found In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995) dispositive.  There, the Second Circuit held that a court must decline to appoint substitute arbitrators where the parties have contractually agreed to have only one arbitrator arbitrate any disputes between them.  Despite the federal policy favoring arbitration, the Court explained in Solomon that there is no further promise to arbitrate in another forum when the contractually agreed-upon arbitrator refuses to dispute the question. 

 

Thus, under In re Salomon, the present question in this case is whether the language of the parties' agreement contemplates arbitration before only the named arbitration forum, or whether it contemplates the appointment of a substitute arbitrator should the named arbitrator forum become unavailable. The Court held that the present arbitration agreement in this case contains numerous indications that the parties contemplated one thing: arbitration before the named arbitration forum.

 

In support, the Second Circuit cited the arbitration's clause language that the disputes shall be resolved by the named arbitration forum.  The arbitration clause also identified the named arbitration forum's code of procedure.  Furthermore, the clause states that the named arbitration forum would pay the arbitration fees if a borrower could not pay them.  Significant to the Second Circuit, the agreement made no provision for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator should the named arbitrator forum become unavailable. 

 

The Court concluded that the matter was similar to In re Solomon because of the mandatory language, the pervasive references to the named arbitration forum in the agreement, and the absence of any indication that the parties would assent to arbitration before a substitute arbitrator if the named arbitration forum became unavailable.

 

The Second Circuit did not find the banks' argument relying on the Federal Arbitration Act's directive that a court shall designate a substitute arbitrator if there is a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator.   The Court explained that the named arbitration forum's refusal to arbitrate the matter was not a lapse, because a lapse refers to a lapse in time or some other mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process. 

 

Last, the Court acknowledged that there was a difference of opinion among the federal courts of appeal on this issue.  The Second Circuit did not favor one interpretation over the other, but simply explained that they were bound by In re Solomon. 

 

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

 

 

 

 

Ralph T. Wutscher
Maurice Wutscher LLP
The Loop Center Building
105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Direct:  (312) 551-9320
Fax: (312) 284-4751

Mobile:  (312) 493-0874
Email: rwutscher@MauriceWutscher.com

 

Admitted to practice law in Illinois

 

 

 

Alabama   |   California   |   Florida   |   Georgia   |   Illinois   |   Indiana   |   Massachusetts   |   New Jersey   |   New York   |   Ohio   |   Pennsylvania   |   Texas   |   Washington, DC

 

 

NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you.


Our updates and webinar presentations are available on the internet, in searchable format, at:

 

Financial Services Law Updates

 

and

 

The Consumer Financial Services Blog

 

and

 

Webinars

 

and

 

California Finance Law Developments

 

and

 

Insurance Recovery Services